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TIME WARPS AND IDENTITY CRISES:
MUDDLING THROUGH THE
MISNOMER/MISIDENTIFICATION MESS
DIANE S. KAPLAN* & KIMBERLY L. CRAFr
INTRODUCTION

This article addresses two statutory provisions of the Illinois
Code of Civil Procedure: the "misnomer" provision, paragraph 2-

401(b),' and the "misidentification" provision, paragraph 2-616(d). 2
Both provisions are intended to cure pleading errors regarding the

naming of defendants3 after the expiration of the statute of limitations. However, the misnomer provision simply cures spelling errors while the misidentification provision permits the postlimitations joinder of a new party. Although the statutes are
facially dissimilar and the courts purport to construe each indepen-

dently, the factors which distinguish one circumstance from the
* Diane S. Kaplan is a graduate of the University of California at Berkeley, B.A., and the Yale Law School, J.D. She is currently an Associate Professor at The John Marshall Law School.
** Kimberly L. Craft is a graduate of DePaul University, M.M./B.M., and a
third-year student at The John Marshall Law School. She is employed at the
law firm of Michael H. Postilion, Ltd. in Chicago.
1. As of January 1, 1993, the Illinois Revised Statutes were replaced with
the Illinois Compiled Statutes (ILL. COMP. STAT.), a reorganization and
renumeration of the Illinois statutes, adopted pursuant to P.A. 87-1005, effective
September 3, 1992. The "misnomer" provision, formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, para. 2-401(b) (1991) is now cited as 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-401(b) (1992).
For simplicity, this provision will be referred to as 2-401(b) in the text. For a
history of 2-401, see Albert E. Jenner, Jr., et al., Historicaland PracticeNotes
[of 2-401], ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-401 (Smith-Hurd 1983) [hereinafter
Historicaland PracticeNotes of 2-401].
2. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-616(d) (1992) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para.
2-616(d) (1991)). For the sake of clarity, the provision will be referred to simply
as 2-616(d). For a history of prior laws see Albert E. Jenner, Jr., et al., Historical and PracticeNotes [of 2-616], ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-616 (West 1983
and Supp. 1993) [hereinafter Historical and PracticeNotes of 2-616].
Perhaps of interest to the reader, the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure does
not provide a truly adequate means of identifying this provision. Thus, the authors have borrowed the term "misidentification" from federal statute, FED. R.
Civ. P. 15(c), and those corresponding committee and advisory notes which use
the term as it relates to failure to name the real party in interest.
3. For an interesting discussion of situations where defendants were added
to suits under special circumstances, see Changes in PartyAfter Statute of Limitations Has Run, 8 A.L.R.2D 6, 29 (1949) (discussing adding defendants as a
necessary party, after acquiring an interest pendente lite, as a joint obligor, additional tortfeasor, successor in title, as additional party in proceedings in rem,
or on his own application).
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other are vague and confused and frequently overlap. An improper
application of misnomer is usually of no consequence to the outcome of the suit, whereas an improper application of misidentification will bar plaintiff's redress against the defendant. To avoid the
severe penalty imposed by the improper use of misidentification,
lawyers frequently argue misidentification and misnomer as alternatives to each other. Some courts have exacerbated the confusion
by skewing their analyses to protect favored parties who are on the
wrong side of the applicable provision. As a result, Illinois case law
is now permeated with the confusion generated by the uses and misuses of these two provisions.
Sections I and II of this article analyze the case law arising
under the misnomer and misidentification provisions. Section III
addresses specific areas of confusion and sets forth guidelines which
categorize various situations appropriate for either the misnomer or
misidentification provisions. Section IV proposes statutory amendments which are intended to resolve the problems caused by the
current statutory scheme.
I.

MISNOMER

Paragraph 2-401(b) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure provides: "Misnomer of a party is not a ground for dismissal but the
name of any party may be corrected at any time, before or after
judgment, on motion, upon any terms and proof that the court requires."'4 Courts have limited the scope of the term "misnomer" 5 to
two specific situations: the correction of spelling errors6 and the
4. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-401(b) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-401(b)).
5. Misnomer is defined as "a mistake in name." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1000 (6th ed. 1990). Unfortunately, this common meaning has probably contributed greatly to the confusion regarding interpretation of the term and application to case law. The only Illinois Supreme Court guidance presently available
is the comment that misnomer signifies "misspelling" rather than misnaming.
Vaughn v. Speaker, 126 Ill. 2d 150, 158, 533 N.E.2d 885, 888 (1988), cert. denied,
492 U.S. 907 (1989); see also Historicaland PracticeNotes of 2-401, supra note 1
(stating that the misnomer provision in 2-401(b) does not include naming the
wrong party, which is provided for in 2-616). Limiting misnomer's definition
to refer to the "misspelling" of a proper party's name, rather than the naming
of a wrong party makes the most sense since a separate provision covering the

"misnaming" of a party already exists. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-616(d) (ILL.

STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-616(d)). This theory is further supported by the
relative stringency of each provision: 2-401(b)'s requirements are very liberal,
in keeping with the correction of simple 'spelling errors; on the other hand, 2616(d)'s requirements are numerous and strict, in an effort to protect innocent
parties. For a discussion of the requirements of the two statutes, see infra notes
7-187 and accompanying text.
6. For example, plaintiff serves the real party in interest but misspells the
party's surname in the complaint and/or the summons. See, e.g., Thielke v.
Osman Constr. Corp., 129 Ill. App. 3d 948, 473 N.E.2d 574 (1st Dist. 1985) (permitting service of summons after plaintiff erroneously spelled Osman as
Osmond).
REV.
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designation of the real party in interest by reference to an incorrect
name.7 Paragraph 2-401(b) does not require the plaintiff to re-serve
the real party in interest, but it does allow an action commenced
against a party of one name to be continued against the same party
subsequently designated by another name.8 The linchpin of the
misnomer provision is the naming of the real party in interest in
the original action. If the plaintiff named the real party in interest,
even though incorrectly, misnomer allows the error to be corrected
at any time, before or after judgment. On the other hand, if the
plaintiff did not name the real party in interest in the original action but later seeks to add that party, then the issue changes from
misnomer to joinder and is governed by the misidentification provision, paragraph 2-616(d), 9 which must take into account the applicable statute of limitations. The distinction between the correction of
a current party's name and the addition of a new party comports
with the rationale underlying paragraph 2-401(b), which is "to avoid
dismissal of cases on a purely technical basis and to allow the action
to reach its substantive merits." 10
It is important to note that paragraph 2-401(b) does not avoid
the statute of limitations. The plaintiff must still file the action
within the applicable limitations period. However, if paragraph 2401(b) applies, actual service of summons after the expiration of the
statute of limitations will not bar an amendment. 1 ' This is a criti7. See, e.g., Hatcher v. Kentner, 120 Ill. App. 3d 571, 458 N.E.2d 131 (3d
Dist. 1983) (allowing plaintiff to amend her complaint after erroneously naming
defendant as "Danelle Kenter", when the true party was "Earline Kenter").
For a detailed discussion of the Hatchercase, see infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Ellis v. Borisek, 220 Ill. App. 3d 48, 580 N.E.2d 899 (3d Dist.
1991) (allowing misnomer to substitute individual in place of corporation); Greil
v. Travelodge Int'l, Inc., 186 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 541 N.E.2d 1288 (1st Dist. 1989)
(allowing misnomer to correct an improper use of corporate name); 7hielke, 129
Ill. App. 3d 948, 473 N.E.2d 574 (allowing amendment of the complaint after the
statute of limitations had expired to correct a misspelling); Hatcher, 120 Ill.
App. 3d 571, 458 N.E.2d 131 (allowing misnomer to be used to correct an error in
the defendant's first name); Griffith v. Pincham, 67 Ill. App. 3d 316, 384 N.E.2d
870 (1st Dist. 1978) (holding that a police report identified the proper defendant,
thereby precluding the plaintiff from serving summons after the statute of limitations expired); Borkoski v. Tumilty, 52 Ill. App. 3d 839, 368 N.E.2d 136 (3d
Dist. 1977) (allowing plaintiff to use misnomer to amend complaint to name a
municipal corporation doing business as a hospital); Ingram v. MFA Ins. Co., 18
Ill. App. 3d 560, 309 N.E.2d 690 (2d Dist. 1974) (using appellate authority to correct a complaint naming an insurance company under its trade name).
9. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-616(d) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-616(d)).
10. Greil, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 1066, 541 N.E.2d at 1291.
11. In general, the courts have held that so long as the summons is served
with "due diligence," as defined under ILL. S.CT. RuLE 103(b) (1971) (ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110A, para. 103(b) (1991)), the claim will not be barred even if served
after the expiration of the statute of limitations. This is assuming, of course,
that a genuine misnomer situation has occurred. See Barbour v. Fred Berglund
and Sons, Inc., 208 Ill. App. 3d 644, 567 N.E.2d 509 (1st Dist. 1990) (holding that

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 26:257

cally important feature of misnomer since a great many paragraph
2-401(b) amendments are sought to cure naming problems arising in
complaints filed at the eleventh hour.12 Illinois case law has steadfastly held that if the plaintiff files the complaint within the limitations period and exercises due diligence in serving the summons,
then, if otherwise appropriate, paragraph 2-401(b) can be applied to
13
cure the misnomer and salvage the claim.
Thielke v. Osman Construction Corp.14 is a classic example of
the proper application of the misnomer statute. The plaintiff was
injured while working at a construction site. Nine days before the
expiration of the statute of limitations, the plaintiff filed a complaint naming Osmond & Associates, Inc. as one of the defendants.
After the statute expired, the plaintiff learned that the defendant's
correct name was Osman & Associates, Inc. and moved to amend
the complaint pursuant to paragraph 2-401(b). The defendant objected to the amendment, arguing that the plaintiff was really attempting to join a new party after the running of the statute of
misnomer was not proper when plaintiff served an improper defendant not involved in the original incident giving rise to the cause of action); Kern v. Uregas
Serv. of W. Frankfort, Inc., 90 Ill. App. 3d 182, 412 N.E.2d 1037 (5th Dist. 1980)
(holding that an amendment correcting the name of a served defendant was
proper in light of the plaintiff's efforts to locate the correct party). Of course,
the question of how much diligence is due, or how much time a plaintiff has to
serve beyond the expiration of the limitations period is determined on a case by
case basis. In one case, for example, the court felt that given the circumstances,
service coming seven years after the expiration of the limitations period was
still acceptable. Shiner v. Friedman, 161 Ill. App. 3d 73, 513 N.E.2d 862 (1st Dist.
1987) (allowing plaintiff to amend complaint to correct inadvertent error in
naming proper parties).
12. What frequently happens is that a plaintiff, filing an eleventh hour
claim, is operating under an erroneous belief as to the spelling of defendant's
name and, thus, cannot locate the party in time to serve it within the statute of
limitations. Subsequently the plaintiff learns of the error during discovery proceedings. The plaintiff seeks to amend its complaint and, at this point, the defendant makes a motion for summary judgment, arguing that a non-existent
party had been served and that the amended complaint is now time-barred. See,
e.g., Barbour,208 Ill. App. 3d 644, 567 N.E.2d 509 (holding that misnomer was
not applicable to complaint filed three days before the expiration of the statute
of limitations that named wrong party at wrong address); Turner v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 180 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 536 N.E.2d 806 (1st Dist. 1989) (stating that
defendant, under normal circumstances, could invoke the statute of limitations
defense where the trustee was served with the complaint five days after it was
filed which was on the day the statute of limitations expired); Thielke, 129 Ill.
App. 3d 948, 473 N.E.2d 574 (applying misnomer provision to correct a misspelling in a complaint filed nine days before the statute of limitations lapsed).
13. See, e.g., Ellis v. Borisek, 220 Ill. App. 3d 48, 580 N.E.2d 899 (3d Dist.
1991) (allowing use of misnomer after real party in interest was served under a
wrong name and plaintiff promptly corrected the error); Greil, 186 Ill. App. 3d
1061, 541 N.E.2d 1288 (applying misnomer where plaintiff named a non-entity in
the complaint but served an agent of the real party in interest and quickly
amended the complaint after learning of the error). For a discussion of the role
due diligence plays in the misnomer process, see supra note 11.
14. Thielke, 129 Ill. App. 3d 948, 473 N.E.2d 574.
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limitations, pursuant to paragraph 2-616, rather than correcting the
misnomer of an otherwise properly identified defendant, pursuant
paragraph 2-401(b). To determine whether the plaintiff was seeking name correction or joinder, the court had to determine, first,
who the plaintiff intended to sue and, second, whether the party
sued was the real party in interest to the suit. As to the first question, the court found that the plaintiff intended to sue the general
contractor and owner of the real estate where the injury occurred,
and that this intent was borne out by the pleadings. As to the second question, the court found that service had been directed to Osman's proper address. Accordingly, the court held that misnomer
15
applied and allowed the post-limitations amendment.
By way of contrast, Barbour v. Fred Berglund & Sons' 6 is a
well reasoned opinion which rejected a misnomer analysis in favor
of misidentification and, in so doing, cost the plaintiff access to the
court. The plaintiff filed a personal injury action within three days
of the running of the statute of limitations naming Bergman Construction of 3116 River Road, River Grove, Illinois, as the only defendant. After the expiration of the statute of limitations, the
plaintiff moved to quash the Bergman summons and amend the
complaint to designate Fred Berglund & Sons, Inc. of 8410 South
Chicago Avenue, Chicago, as the defendant. Fred Berglund & Sons,
Inc. filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff's complaint
did not misname the real party in interest, but rather, named the
wrong party and, therefore, could not relate back to the date of the
original complaint. The court noted that "[t]he intent of the plaintiff is a pivotal inquiry into the determination of whether a particular case involves misnomer or mistaken identity.' 7 The plaintiff
15. Id. Of note, there is at least one case which appears to run contrary to

the majority's interpretation of the misnomer provision. The Illinois Appellate
Court for the First District stated:
[M]isnomer is recognized where plaintiff sues and serves the right party
but by the wrong name, as opposed to naming the wrong party [citations
omitted]. The pivotal determination is whether plaintiff actually serves the
real party in interest with a copy of the complaint and summons, within the
time limits allowed by law, so that actual notice of the complaint that has
been lodged against it and notice of the need to respond has been given to
that party in interest, albeit incorrectly named [citations omitted].

Yedor v. Centre Properties, Inc., 173 Ill. App. 3d 132, 137-38, 527 N.E.2d 414, 417
(1st Dist. 1988) (emphasis added). While the facts in Yedor did not require the
court to discuss its position in detail regarding service of summons, Yedor appears to hold that service must be had upon a party within the statute of limitations, even in a misnomer situation. Yedor is, however, in the minority. It
appears that the court may have confused misnomer with the more stringent
requirements of the misidentification provision. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2616(d)(1) and (4) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-616(d)(1) and (4)) (requiring

that service be had upon the real party in interest, his or her agent, or partner,
before the expiration of the limitations period).
16. Barbour,208 Ill. App. 3d 644, 567 N.E.2d 509.
17. Id. at 648, 567 N.E.2d at 512.
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insisted that logically he could not have intended to sue the wrong
party and that he had always intended to sue the general contractor. Nevertheless, the court sided with the defendant, finding that
Bergman Construction Company was not the real party in interest
and that "the real party in interest was neither named nor served
until approximately six months after the statute of limitations had
run. 18s The court concluded that the misnomer statute could not be
invoked to cure the error and salvage the cause of action. 19
A.
1.

The Liberal Trend

The Real Party In Interest Factor

Most misnomer cases address and split on the issue of the legal
capacity of the defendant to be sued. In a prototypical situation
such as the Barbour case, a plaintiff mistakenly designates a defendant by a name which is not a recognized legal entity but does
not learn of the error until after the expiration of the statute of
limitations. Since, under Illinois law, suits against non-entities are
void ab initio,20 the court will dismiss such complaints unless they
can be saved by some countervailing factor.2 1 However, under a
liberal line of cases starting in 1974 and continuing to the present, if
the non-entity by one name is the real party in interest by another
name, then the error can be characterized as misnomer and the
cause of action saved.2 2 For example, in the seminal case of Ingram
v. MFA Insurance Co.,23 the plaintiff received a default judgment
18. Id. at 650, 567 N.E.2d at 513.
19. Id. at 652, 567 N.E.2d at 514.
20. In a case where the plaintiff brought suit against a non-existent entity,
the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District stated:
Where a suit is brought against an entity which is legally non-existent, the
proceedings are void ab initio, and its invalidity may be called to the court's
attention at any stage of the proceedings. A complaint which does not
name a party legally in existence is in reality a nullity as to that party [citations omitted].
Tyler v. J.C. Penney Co., 145 Ill. App. 3d 967, 972-73, 496 N.E.2d 323, 327 (4th
Dist. 1986).
21. "These general jurisdictional rules are expressly excepted in the case of
misnomer." Cohen, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 753, 555 N.E.2d at 62. See also 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/2-401(b) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-401(b)). The Illinois
Appellate Court in Cohen further stated that "[a) judgment is valid where circumstances indicate the individual actually served notice is the person intended
to be sued, even though the issued process does not refer to him by his correct
name." Cohen, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 753, 555 N.E.2d at 62 (citing Ingram v. MFA
Ins. Co., 18 Ill. App. 3d 560, 566, 309 N.E.2d 690, 695 (2d Dist. 1974)).
22. See infra notes 23-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of this line
of cases: Ellis v. Borisek, 220 Ill. App. 3d 48, 580 N.E.2d 899 (3d Dist. 1991); Greil
v. Travelodge Int'l, Inc., 186 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 541 N.E.2d 1288 (1st Dist. 1989);
Hatcher v. Kentner, 120 Ill. App. 3d 571, 458 N.E.2d 131 (3d Dist. 1983);
Borkoski v. Tumilty, 52 Ill. App. 3d 839, 368 N.E.2d 136 (3d Dist. 1977).
23. Ingram v. MFA, 18 Ill. App. 3d 560, 309 N.E.2d 690 (2d Dist. 1974).
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against an insurance company sued in its trade name. The insurance company attempted to vacate the default judgment by arguing
that since the plaintiff had sued a nonexistent legal entity, the judgment was void ab initio. The court rejected the defendant's argument, stating: "[w]here summons is served upon a party and the
circumstances are such as to indicate that he is the person intended
to be sued, he is subject to the judgment even though the process
'24
and judgment do not refer to him by his correct name.
To determine if the defendant was, indeed, the party the plaintiff had intended to sue, the court found that: (i) the person served
was the agent of the real party in interest; (ii) the real party in interest itself used its trade name in the regular course of business;
and, (iii) the real party in interest had participated in the litigation
under its trade name, thereby depriving the plaintiff of notice that
it had sued the defendant in the wrong name. Finding the plaintiff's use of and reliance upon the defendant's trade name to be reasonable, the court invoked its appellate authority to treat the error
25
as a misnomer.
The Ingram analysis and holding were applied in Borkoski v.
Tumilty,2 6 Hatcher v. Kentner, 27 Greil v. Travelodge International,

Inc.,28 and Ellis v. Borisek.29 In each of these cases, the complaints
initially named defendants who lacked capacity to be sued. After
the expiration of the statute of limitations the complaints were
amended pursuant to the minomer provision because the real party
in interest had been sued within the limitations' period. Each case
found that the plaintiff had intended to sue the real party in interest;30 the party served was either an agent of the real party in interest 3' or an identity of interest existed between the party served and
the real party in interest such that the plaintiff's error was reason24. Id. at 566, 309 N.E.2d at 695.
25. Id at 566-67, 309 N.E.2d at 696 (Illinois Appellate Court using the authority granted it by ILL. S. CT. RULE 362(f) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para.
362(f) (1991)).
26. Borkoski, 52 Ill. App. 3d 839, 368 N.E.2d 136. See infra notes 27-35.
While estoppel may not specifically have been argued or addressed in the following cases, the authors believe that estoppel influences underly each of these
cases.
27. 120 Ill. App. 3d 571, 458 N.E.2d 131 (3d Dist. 1983).
28. 186 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 541 N.E.2d 1288 (1st Dist. 1989).
29. 220 Ill. App. 3d 48, 580 N.E.2d 899 (3d Dist. 1991).
30. Id. at 52, 580 N.E.2d at 902; Greil, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 1066, 541 N.E.2d at
1291; Hatcher,120 Ill. App. 3d at 575, 458 N.E.2d at 133-34; Borkoski, 52 Ill. App.
3d at 842, 368 N.E.2d at 138.
31. Ellis, 220 Ill. App. 3d at 52, 580 N.E.2d at 902; Greil, 186 Ill. App. 3d at
1066, 541 N.E.2d at 1291; Hatcher, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 575, 458 N.E.2d at 133-34;
Borkoski, 52 Ill. App. 3d at 842, 368 N.E.2d at 138.
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able;32 and, the plaintiff had sought to correct the error with due
33
diligence.
2. The Estoppel Factor
Hatcherv. Kentner 34 and Ellis v. Borisek3 5 present an interesting variation of the prototypical case. In these two cases, the third
district recognized the plaintiffs' arguments that the defendants
should be estopped to assert a statute of limitations defense since
the defendants had participated in the litigation under the incorrect
name until after the statute had run.
Hatcher was the first case to recognize the estoppel exception
to the statute of limitations defense. In Hatcher, the plaintiff was
injured by a car driven by Earline Kentner but owned by her husband, Daniel. Two days before the running of the statute of limitations, the plaintiff filed a complaint naming "Danelle" Kentner as
the defendant. The answer admitted that "Danelle" Kentner was
the owner and operator of the vehicle. The defendant also responded to a document production request and interrogatories
under the name Danelle Kentner. Once the error was discovered,
the plaintiff filed a motion to amend her complaint to change the
defendant's name from Danelle to Earline. The trial court denied
this motion and, instead, permitted the defendant to amend her answer to deny that Danelle Kentner was the owner and operator of
the vehicle. Thereafter, the defendant prevailed on a motion for
36
summary judgment.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the defendant should have
been estopped to deny that the error was a misnomer rather than a
misidentification because she had "participated in the error itself."3 7 The court found that, although never served, the complaint
had been directed to a female whose last name was Kentner, who
resided at the designated address, and who drove the designated car
on the designated day and time.3 8 The court found that there could
be no reasonable confusion that the complaint had designated Mrs.
rather than Mr. Kentner as the defendant. Accordingly, the court
32. Ellis, 220 Ill. App. 3d at 52, 580 N.E.2d at 902; Greil, 186 Ill. App. 3d at
1065-66, 541 N.E.2d at 1290-91; Hatcher,120 Ill. App. 3d at 575, 458 N.E.2d at 13334; Borkoski, 52 Ill. App. 3d at 842, 368 N.E.2d at 138.
33. Ellis, 220 Ill. App. 3d at 53, 580 N.E.2d at 902; Greil, 186 Ill. App. 3d at
1066, 541 N.E.2d at 1291.
34. Hatcher, 120 Ill. App. 3d 571, 458 N.E.2d 131.
35. Ellis, 220 Ill. App. 3d 48, 580 N.E.2d 899.
36. Hatcher, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 573, 458 N.E.2d at 132.
37. Id.
38. Id. The court listed these factors to demonstrate that defendant had
notice of the suit and was able to defend against it. Id.

Misnomer/Misidentification
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deemed the error a misnomer rather than a misidentification.3 9
Furthermore, the court noted that the defendant had participated
in and perpetuated the error by filing a responsive pleading "which
'40
failed to take issue with the alleged identity of the defendant.
Although never specifically referring to "estoppel," the Hatcher
court utilized the estoppel concept to salvage a misnomer action in
which the error was the naming of a non-existent person rather
41
than the misspelling of the correctly identified defendant.
In Ellis v. Borisek,42 a dram shop case, the complaint originally
named a tavern called Friday's of Peru, Ltd. as the defendant. The
complaint was served upon Alan Borisek, the owner of the tavern
and liquor license. Unknown to the plaintiff, Friday's of Peru, Ltd.
had undergone involuntary dissolution several years earlier but was
still operated by Borisek under its former corporate name. After
the expiration of the statute of limitations, the plaintiff amended
the complaint to designate "Alan Borisek d/b/a Friday's of Peru,
Ltd." as the proper defendant. As in Hatcher,although the plaintiff
had sued a non-entity, the court characterized the error as misnomer rather than misidentification, based in part on its findings that
the defendant had participated in the litigation under the name
"Friday's of Peru, Ltd.," failed to raise the identity issue in its answer, and made no attempt to correct the error for another six
months thereafter. The court also took into account the plaintiff's
diligence in correcting the error and the fact that, as the real party
in interest, Alan Borisek obviously had been aware that the action
was pending and that there was no legal entity named Friday's of
43

Peru, Ltd.

Sandwiched between Hatcher and Ellis, but recognized by
neither, was the Illinois Supreme Court case of Vaughn v.
Speaker,44 which expressly condoned the offensive use of estoppel
39. Id. at 575, 458 N.E.2d at 133-34. In further support of her position, plaintiff argued that she used female gender pronouns (she, her), evidencing an intent to sue the female Kentner, Earline, rather than the male Kentner, Daniel.
Id at 575, 458 N.E.2d at 133. In addition, the court held that plaintiff's actual
intent was clear from the pleadings and, thus, controlling. Plaintiff had, in fact,
named the proper party merely under a wrong name. The court reasoned "[t]o
hold otherwise would.., clearly exalt form over substance and allow defendant
to deprive plaintiff of her day in court and frustrate on a minor technicality the
resolution of the litigation on the merits." Id. at 575, 458 N.E.2d at 133-34.
40. Id. at 573, 458 N.E.2d at 132.
41. While the court failed to elaborate on the estoppel idea or reference it
specifically in the holding, it should be noted that plaintiff had set forth an
estoppel argument in her pleading: "defendant should be estopped from denying ... misnomer since she participated in the error itself." Hatcher, 120 Ill.
App. 3d at 573, 458 N.E.2d at 132.
42. 220 Ill. App. 3d 48, 580 N.E.2d 899 (3d Dist. 1991).
43. Id. at 53, 580 N.E.2d at 902.
44. 126 Ill. 2d 150, 533 N.E.2d 885 (1988).
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in the misnomer/misidentification context. In Vaughn, the court
found that the designation error failed to qualify as either misnomer 45 or misidentification, 46 but nonetheless, remanded the case for
a determination of whether the defendant had engaged in such conduct that it should be estopped to assert a statute of limitations
47
defense.
45. Id. In finding that the facts presented did not constitute misnomer, the
court stated:
We cannot conclude that changing the name of the defendant from decedent to his executors is simply the correction of a misnomer. This is not a
situation where, for example, a plaintiff merely misspelled a defendant's
surname or used an incorrect common name. Instead, plaintiffs here intentionally sued Wilber P. Speaker when they should have sued his estate ....
[A]n individual and his estate exist contemporaneously and are wholly distinct legal entities. Accordingly, substitution of the estate for the decedent
was not merely the correction of a misnomer ....
Id. at 158-59, 533 N.E.2d at 888-89.
46. In deciding that the misidentification provision was inapplicable, the
court stated: "Section 2-616(d) provides no relief to plaintiffs because the fourth
requirement of that provision was not met: there is no indication or assertion
that either co-executor knew prior to the running of the statute of limitations
that a complaint had been filed." Vaughn, 126 Ill. 2d at 160, 533 N.E.2d at 889.
For a detailed discussion of the misidentification provision and its requirement
that service be within the limitations period, see text accompanying notes 93187.
47. Vaughn, 126 Ill. 2d at 167, 533 N.E.2d at 892. The court noted that equitable estoppel may arise even though there was no intention on the part of the
party estopped to relinquish any existing right. Id at 161, 533 N.E.2d at 890.
Further, prejudice to the other party is one of the essential elements of an equitable estoppel. Id. at 161-62, 533 N.E.2d at 890. In this case, it was asserted that
defendants' conduct so misled plaintiffs that defendants were estopped to assert
a statute of limitations defense, whether in the misnomer or misidentification
context. Id. at 155, 533 N.E.2d at 887. In reaching its decision, the court reiterated the six elements required for equitable estoppel:
[1] ... [W]ords or conduct by the party against whom the estoppel is
alleged amounting to a misrepresentation or concealment of material facts.
[2] ... [T]he party against whom the estoppel is alleged must have had
knowledge at the time the representations were made that the representations were untrue. This knowledge need not be actual but may be implied;
misrepresentations made with gross negligence can form a basis for equitable estoppel.
[3] ... [T]he truth respecting the representations so made must be unknown to the party claiming the benefit of the estoppel at the time that the
representations were made and at the time that they were acted on by him.
[4] ... [T]he party estopped must intend or reasonably expect that his
conduct or representations will be acted upon by the party asserting the
estoppel or the public generally; the conduct and representations must be
such as would ordinarily lead to the results complained of.
[5] .. . T]he party claiming the benefit of the estoppel must have in
good faith relied upon the misrepresentation to his detriment ....
[T]his
reliance must be reasonable, and a party claiming estoppel cannot have acted improvidently ....
[I]t is also true that if the party alleged to be estopped is guilty of actual intentional deceit and he reasonably expected his
deceptive statements or conduct to be relied upon, he is in no position to
contend that the party acting upon his deception was negligent in doing so.
This is consistent with the principle that one guilty of fraudulent misrepre-
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The Vaughn opinion has double significance. First, and most
obvious, it is important because it places the court's imprimatur on
the estoppel argument. Second, and less obvious, in recognizing the
estoppel argument, the court has blurred the distinction between
misnomer and misidentification by allowing both concepts to be
overridden in circumstances giving rise to estoppel. The estoppel
argument thus provides a potential safe-haven for actions which
otherwise may be lost to the distinction between misnomer and misidentification and, in so doing, renders their individual characterizations less likely, and, less necessary.
B.

The Contra-LiberalTrend

The liberal trend is rivaled by a contemporaneous line of cases
from the first and fourth districts which reject or ignore the policies
and equitable principles factored into the liberal trend cases. In the
prototypical contra-liberal case, the plaintiff files an eleventh hour
action against a defendant who not only lacks capacity to be sued,
but also, is not the real party in interest to the suit. 48 Typically, the

court holds that the suit is void ab initio because it was brought
against a non-entity.49 Unlike the liberal trend, which tries to salvage some of these actions by factoring in estoppel,5 ° due dilisentation cannot assert that the person defrauded was negligent in failing
to discover the truth.
[6] . .. [Tihe party claiming the benefit of the estoppel must have so
acted, because of such representations or conduct, that he would be
prejudiced if the first party is permitted to deny the truth thereof.
Id. at 162-63, 533 N.E.2d at 890 (citing Lowenberg v. Booth, 330 Ill. 548, 555-56,
162 N.E.2d 91, 93 (1928)). For further proceedings on these facts, see In re
Speaker, 236 Ill. App. 3d. 954, 603 N.E.2d 1194 (3d Dist. 1992) (holding that
claimants were not entitled to personal notice as "known creditors" and that
failure to inventory insurance policy among estate assets did not extend time
period for filing a claim).
48. See, e.g., Thompson v. Ware, 210 Ill. App. 3d 16, 568 N.E.2d 500 (4th Dist.
1991) (holding that service on "Lynette Marie Ware", the identical twin sister of
the real party in interest, "Lynette Marie Owens", did not meet the requirements of misnomer); Cohen Furniture Co. v. Sumpter, 197 Ill. App. 3d 751, 555
N.E.2d 60 (4th Dist. 1990) (holding that naming a sole proprietorship as a corporate entity constitutes naming the wrong party, not misnomer); Hoppa v. Schermerhorn, 192 Ill. App. 3d 832, 549 N.E.2d 667 (1st Dist. 1989) (holding that
plaintiff's failure to properly serve defendant as an officer of the corporation or
an individual voided judgment and refused to allow application of misnomer);
Tyler v. J.C. Penney Co., 145 Ill. App. 3d 967, 496 N.E.2d 323 (4th Dist. 1986)
(holding that a suit brought against a non-existent party is void ab initio and a
nullity); Griffith v. Pincham, 67 Ill. App. 3d 316, 384 N.E.2d 870 (1st Dist. 1978)
(holding that plaintiff's inability to effect service on an agent or representative
of the real party in interest voided the claim).
49. Kappel v. Errera, 164 Ill. App. 3d 673, 677, 518 N.E.2d 226, 229 (1st Dist.
1987).
50. Vaughn, 126 Ill. 2d 150, 533 N.E.2d 885; Ellis v. Borisek, 220 Ill. App. 3d
48, 580 N.E.2d 899 (3d Dist. 1991). For a discussion on the role of estoppel in
cases of erroneously named parties, see supra notes 34-47 and accompanying
text.
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gence,51 intent,5 2 or actual notice to the real party in interest,5 3 the
contra-liberal trend restricts its analysis to strict application of
black letter principles without the benefit of contemporary inquiries or analyses. As a result, the decisions in this line of cases are
predicated upon legal concepts which, when viewed in a contemporary context, are either partially correct or wholly incorrect, and
result in analyses which are dated and lack resilience.
For example, in Griffith v. Pincham,54 the first in this line of
cases, the plaintiff filed an eleventh hour personal injury action
against "Sherry" Pincham, the driver of the automobile involved in
a personal injury action, and Eugene Pincham, its owner. Shortly
after the statute of limitations had run, Alzata Pincham (Eugene's
wife) was erroneously served with the summons intended for
Sherry. Alzata filed a special appearance and motion to quash on
the grounds of mistaken identity. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff
served on Eugene Pincham a request to admit "that on December
23, 1974, he had a daughter named either 'Sandy' or 'Sherry'
Pincham who was a member of his household. 5 5s Eugene Pincham
objected to the request as "irrelevant and immaterial."' '
Subsequently, in his deposition, "Eugene Pincham stated that he was a
judge of the circuit court of Cook County, criminal division;... his
daughter's [Andrea] nickname was Sandy; . . .on December 23,
1974, his daughter [had been] a member of his household and [had]
told him [of her involvement in an automobile accident]; and.., his
wife was probably present during th[at] conversation."57 Based on
this information, the plaintiff served summons personally on Andrea Pincham. Andrea moved to dismiss on the grounds that the
51. Ellis, 220 Ill.
App. 3d 48, 580 N.E.2d 899; Greil v. Travelodge Int'l, Inc.,
186 Ill.
App. 3d 1061, 541 N.E.2d 1288 (1st Dist. 1989). For a discussion of the
role of due diligence in cases of wrongly named parties, see supra note 11.
52. Ellis, 220 Ill. App. 3d at 52, 580 N.E.2d at 902 (plaintiff intended to sue
owner of tavern); Greil, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 1066, 541 N.E.2d at 1291 (plaintiff
intended to sue company operating as "Travelodge in the Heart of Chicago");
Hatcher v. Kentner, 120 Ill. App. 3d 571, 575, 458 N.E.2d 131, 133 (3d Dist. 1983)
(plaintiff's intent was clear despite the fact the two first names did not "sound"
alike). For a discussion of intent see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
53. Ellis, 220 Ill. App. 3d at 51, 580 N.E.2d at 901; Hatcher,120 Ill. App. 3d at
573, 458 N.E.2d at 132; Ingram v. MFA Ins. Co., 18 Ill. App. 3d 560, 566, 309
N.E.2d 690, 696 (2d Dist. 1974); see supra note 38 (actual notice). "The party in
interest envisioned by the misnomer provisions of 2-401(b) of the Code refers
to whether the parties were before the court, whether they had notice of the
proceedings, and whether they had an opportunity to defend." Thompson v.
Ware, 210 Ill. App. 3d 16, 18, 568 N.E.2d 500, 502 (4th Dist. 1991).
54. 67 Ill. App. 3d 316, 384 N.E.2d 870 (1st Dist. 1978).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 317, 384 N.E.2d at 871-72.
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action against her was barred by the statute of limitations. 58 Attached to the motion was an affidavit in which Andrea denied
knowledge of the action prior to the date on which she was served.
The trial court granted Andrea's motion to dismiss on the grounds
that the real party in interest had not been served within the limitations period and that the error of naming "Sherry" instead of
59
"Sandy" or "Andrea" could not be characterized as a misnomer.
The court of appeals affirmed the rejection of misnomer on two
grounds. First, since Andrea and Alzata were separate individuals,
service upon one could not constitute service upon the other, nor
could the parent-child relationship be treated as an agency relationship for service of process purposes. 60 Second, the plaintiff had notice of her mistake before the expiration of the statute of
limitations by virtue of the answers of Eugene and Alzata, stating
that proper service had not been effected, and the investigative police report which indicated that the driver had been "Sandy"
Pincham. The court concluded that the plaintiff's untimely service
61
could not be excused as inadvertent.
The appellate court was correct in its statement and application
of the first principle: suing the mother is not the same, for misnomer purposes, as suing the daughter. The second part of its opinion,
however, was incorrect. First, inadvertence is not a condition of
misnomer. It is a condition of misidentification,6 2 and, as a matter
of precedent or policy, had not previously been factored into a mis58. Id. at 318, 384 N.E.2d at 872. "The original complaint... was filed approximately six weeks before the statute of limitations expired incorrectly
naming 'Sherry' Pincham as a defendant. It was not until after the limitations
period expired that the complaint was amended to correctly name 'Andrea'
Pincham as the defendant." Id. at 318, 384 N.E.2d at 872.
59. The appellate court would later express its displeasure with the
plaintiff:
In the instant case an investigative police report clearly indicated the party
was "Sandy" Pincham [Andrea's nickname was Sandy]. There is nothing in
the record to indicate why plaintiff did not rely on or use that information
prior to the filing of the complaint. Likewise the affidavits of Eugene and
Alzata Pincham, filed in court before the two year period expired, advised

plaintiff that proper service had not been effected.
Griffith, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 320-21, 384 N.E.2d at 874.
60. Id. at 319-20, 384 N.E.2d at 872; but see 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-203(a)
(1992) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-203(a) (1991)) (permitting abode service
on one other than the real party in interest).
61. Although the court stated that it did not reach the issue of inadvertence,
the analysis of the agency relationship of the parties was, in fact, discussed in
terms of the parties' inadvertence. Griffith, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 321, 384 N.E.2d at
874. See supra note 59 for the court's rationale in finding that plaintiff's actions
were not inadvertent.
62. "[Flailure to join the person as a defendant was inadvertent." 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/2-616(d)(2) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-616(d)(2)). For a
detailed discussion of inadvertence, see infra notes 119-39 and accompanying
text.
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nomer analysis. Second, the court faulted the plaintiff for failing to
serve Andrea within the statute of limitations. Service within the
statute of limitations is a condition of misidentification,63 not misnomer. 64 By confusing the requirements of these two statutes, the
court twice evaluated the plaintiff's conduct by the wrong standard.
The opinion's most significant analytical shortcoming, however,
lies not in what it said but in what it failed to say. Specifically, it
failed to recognize an estoppel objection to Eugene Pincham's repeated efforts to thwart the plaintiff's attempts to determine the
driver's name.65 The court failed to mitigate the agency defense by
ignoring Andrea's residence in her parents' home at the time of the
accident, her parents' awareness of the accident and the subsequent
lawsuit, and Andrea's continued residence in Chicago. 66 Further, it
failed to credit the plaintiff with exercising due diligence in her efforts to ascertain the true identity of the driver once she had been
informed of her error by Alzata's motion to quash summons. 67 Had
the first district included in its analysis either the estoppel or due
diligence cures, the plaintiff's action would have survived the motion to dismiss.
Along a similar vein, in Tyler v. J.C. Penney Co. ,68 the fourth
district rejected an estoppel defense to an eleventh hour personal
injury action filed against Market Place Shopping Center ("Market
Place") on the grounds that the defendant, as so designated, was a
non-entity and, therefore, the suit was void ab initio.69 Market
63.

735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-616(d)(1), (4) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-

616(d)(1), (4)). "The time prescribed or limited had not expired when the original action was commenced," and "(4) the person, within the time that the action
might have been brought or the right asserted against him or her, knew that the
original action was pending and that it grew out of a transaction or occurrence
involving or concerning him or her." Id. See infra notes 152-63 and accompany
text for a discussion of the role of knowledge with regard to misidentification.
64. See supra note 12 for cases discussing service in the context of
misnomer.
65. Griffith, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 317-18, 384 N.E.2d at 871-72.
66. Id. at 317-18, 384 N.E.2d at 871-72.
67. Alzata's motion to quash was brought on December 8, 1976. Id at 317,
384 N.E.2d at 871. On January 13, 1977, plaintiff filed a request to admit facts
that Eugene had a daughter named either "Sandy" or "Sherry" Pincham who
was a member of his household. Id. at 317, 384 N.E.2d at 871. The court characterized this conduct as "lacking inadvertence." As will be shown, however, inadvertence is an improper element in a misnomer situation. Rather, it is an
element reserved for misidentification situations. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2616(d)(2) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-616(d)(2)) ("failure to join the person
as a defendant was inadvertent").
68. 145 Ill. App. 3d 967, 496 N.E.2d 323 (4th Dist. 1986).
69. Id. at 972-73, 496 N.E.2d at 327. "Where a suit is brought against an
entity which is legally nonexistent, the proceedings are void ab initio, and its
invalidity may be called to the court's attention at any stage of the proceedings

[citations omitted]. A complaint which does not name a party legally in existence is in reality a nullity as to that party." Id.
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Place was, in fact, the common name of a mall comprised of several
separate businesses. 70 The plaintiff did not learn of his error until
after the defendant had appeared, answered, participated in discovery, filed a third-party complaint, and participated in settlement negotiations through its insurance company for a period in excess of
two years. 7 1 Although Tyler predates Vaughn v. Speaker,72 and,
therefore, is not clearly wrong on the estoppel issue, it did fail to
address such liberal trend issues as notice to the real party in interest, 73 and the underlying purpose of paragraph 2-401(b), to en74
courage resolution of disputes on the merits.
Thompson v. Ware75 posed a fact situation strikingly similar to
Griffith.76 In Thompson, the plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident with a vehicle owned by Lynetta Marie Ware
("Ware"), but which was driven by Ware's identical twin sister,
Lynette Marie Ware Owens ("Owens"). The police report listed the
driver as "Lunite M. Owens" of 110 West Jefferson, Springfield, Illinois. The plaintiff filed a personal injury action against Ware
shortly before the running of the statute of limitations and served
summons on Ware shortly after its expiration. 77 The plaintiff subsequently learned that she had confused the identity of the two sisters when, during their depositions, it became clear that Owens had
driven the car owned by Ware. The plaintiff immediately moved to
correct the error under paragraph 2-401(b). This motion was denied, and summary judgment was entered for the defendant. The
70. The development firm of Landau-Heyman, Inc., through its vice president, submitted an affidavit stating that the Market Place Shopping Center was
not a legal entity and that the "denotation represent[ed] the 'common description of the diverse, independent, [sic] businesses which comprise the entire
shopping mall.'" Tyler, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 969, 496 N.E.2d at 325. "The affidavit
further recounted that Market Place is not a corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, joint venture, or other such entity recognized in law." Id.
71. Id. at 968-69, 496 N.E.2d at 324-25. These events gave rise to plaintiff's
argument that Market Place's conduct estopped it to deny that it had a legal
capacity to be sued and that Market Place waived its argument that it could not
be a proper party defendant. Id. at 971, 496 N.E.2d at 326. Plaintiffs further
contended that "dismissal of their complaint based upon lack of legal capacity,
after Market Place had engaged in litigation over a two-year period, would allow defendant to 'perpetrate a fraud on the court.'" Id.
72. 126 Ill. 2d 150, 533 N.E.2d 885 (1988).
73. See supra notes 20-47 and accompanying text for cases discussing the
liberal trend elements, including notice, estoppel, due diligence, and intent.
74. See supra note 39 for the court's Hatcher opinion on resolving a case on
the merits.
75. 210 Ill. App. 3d 16, 568 N.E.2d 500 (4th Dist. 1991).
76. Griffith v. Pincham, 67 Ill. App. 3d 316, 384 N.E.2d 870 (1st Dist. 1978).
77. The accident occurred on January 12, 1987. The action was filed on December 28, 1988, against Lynetta Marie Ware, and she was served with summons on February 1, 1989. Thompson, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 17, 568 N.E.2d at 501.
Of note, plaintiff clearly failed to serve the original summons within the expiration of the statute of limitations. This may have prompted the court's strict
application of both 2-401(b) and 2-616(d).
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court rejected misnomer based on its finding that the plaintiff had
not sued the real party in interest under the wrong name, but
rather, had sued the wrong party. 78 The court rejected misidentification because the real party in interest had not been served within
79
the statute of limitations period.
Although paragraphs 2-401(b) and 2-616(d) were correctly applied to the facts, the court was unnecessarily penurious in limiting
the scope of its analysis to those particular facts. For example, the
court omitted from its analysis the plaintiff's intent to sue the
driver of the car; the deposition of Owens, the real party in interest,
which clearly put her on notice of the proceedings; plaintiff's diligence in seeking correction of the error; and, the uniqueness of the
facts causing the confusion.8 0 As in Griffith, the Thompson court
confused the paragraph 2-401(b) analysis with the paragraph 2616(d) analysis by failing to apply misnomer when the real party in
interest was not served with summons until after the expiration of
the statute of limitations. Paragraph 2-616 requires service within
the statute of limitations. Paragraph 2-401(b) does not. Once again,
the court evaluated the plaintiff's conduct by an incorrect legal
standard thus allowing the cause of action to slip between the crevices of misnomer and misidentification.
In Cohen Furniture Co. v. Sumpter,s1 the fourth district affirmed the trial court's vacation of a default judgment entered
against Farmer's Market, Inc. as the employer of Bryan Sumpter,
the driver of an automobile involved in a personal injury action.
The court found that Farmer's Market had been served in its corporate capacity through its assistant manager, Tim Tyson, but that its
owner, Paul Edwards, had not been served. The court rejected the
plaintiff's misnomer argument on the grounds that Edwards, the
real party in interest, had not been served.8 2 The decision, how78. Thompson, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 18, 568 N.E.2d at 502. "In the present case,
it is obvious the plaintiff intended to sue the person driving the vehicle at the
time of the accident. However, the service was on one other than the driver,
and no misnomer took place as to the person served." Id.
79. In addition, the court held that since the real party in interest had not
been served originally, the requirement of 2-616(d)(3) had not been met. Id. at
19, 568 N.E.2d at 502-03. Paragraph 2-616(d)(3) reads: "service of summons was
in fact had upon the person, his or her agent or partner, as the nature of the
defendant made appropriate, even though he or she was served in the wrong
capacity or as agent of another, or upon a trustee ....
" 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/2-616(d)(3) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-616(d)(3)). For a detailed discussion of the agency requirement, see infra text accompanying notes 140-51.
80. Thompson, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 18, 568 N.E.2d at 502. "Regardless of the
peculiar fact situation with which we are now concerned, we conclude that this
case did not involve misnomer as envisioned in paragraph 2-401(b) of the Code."
Id. at 19, 568 N.E.2d at 503.
81. 197 Ill. App. 3d 751, 555 N.E.2d 60 (4th Dist. 1990).
82. Id. at 752, 555 N.E.2d at 62. Plaintiff contended that "Edwards was provided with adequate notice of the action, despite any misnomer in summons,
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ever, was reached without inquiry into the existence of an agency
relationship among Sumpter, Farmer's Market, Tyson, or Edwards.
Without resolution of this issue, it would be impossible to determine if the court had properly applied the real party in interest test.
The mere recitation of the fact that Farmer's Market, Inc. was not a
legal entity and thus, the suit was void and was too conclusory to be
a meaningful application of the law.
Finally, the case of Hoppa v. Schermerhorn83 renders the most
inscrutable contribution to this line of cases. The plaintiff originally brought a personal injury action against undisclosed defendants.8 4 One year later, the plaintiff sought leave to amend his
complaint to "implead" J.P. Schermerhorn & Co. ("Company") and
J.P. Schermerhorn, individually.8 5 Company was served, appeared,
and answered and then, on the same day, was dissolved and reincorporated as Schermerhorn & Co. ("Schermerhorn"). J.P. Schermerhorn, the individual ("J.P."), was never served. Nevertheless, the
court entered a default judgment against Company and J.P. Then,
based on misnomer, the court allowed the plaintiff to amend the
86
judgment in order to add Schermerhorn.
The first district reversed on the grounds that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction over J.P. and Schermerhorn since neither had
been served. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that J.P.'s
continuous personal participation in the action constituted a gen87
eral appearance and a waiver of the personal jurisdiction issue.
The court rejected the application of misnomer to the addition
and/or substitution of Schermerhorn for Company in the judgment
order on the grounds that the latter had dissolved and the former
had never been served.
Both the trial and appellate court opinions indulged a discomforting tolerance for procedural irregularities. The trial court's entry of a default judgment against a party who had never been served
through corporate service upon his management agents at Farmers Market."
Id.
83. 192 Ill. App. 3d 832, 549 N.E.2d 667 (1st Dist. 1989).
84. Authors' note-neither the facts nor the caption of this opinion reveal
the identity of the original defendants.
85. Hoppa, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 833, 549 N.E.2d at 669.
86. Id, at 833, 549 N.E.2d at 670.
87. Id. at 832, 549 N.E.2d at 669-70. An inspection of the cited authority
reveals that the legal assertions put forth by the Hoppa court are probably true.
Id. However, the propositions are valid only as singular principles; the cases
themselves do not actually support the court's reasoning or conclusion. In fact,
it appears that the plaintiff's argument is the one consistent with cited authority. Thus, the court dismissed plaintiff's arguments with no real basis for its
decision. It is interesting to speculate whether the outcome would have differed
had the plaintiff put forth a "misidentification" 2-616(d) argument, or had the
court applied a more liberal treatment of 2-1008, in keeping with the legislature's intent. See infra note 88 for a discussion of substitution of parties.
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may be forgiven as an oversight except for its allowance of the
plaintiff's peculiar use of "impleader" to bring in two additional defendants.88 Equally baffling was the appellate court's rejection of
misnomer as between Company and Schermerhorn. Although it is
correct as a general matter that separate corporate entities cannot
be treated interchangeably,8 9 here we have what appears to be successive corporate entities.90 Allowing the substitution of the latter
88. According to the limited facts of Hoppa, plaintiff sustained injuries in a
traffic accident (occurrence date unknown). Hoppa, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 833, 549
N.E.2d at 669. At the time of initial filing in February 1984, plaintiff did not
name J.P. Schermerhorn & Co. (neither the facts nor the caption reveal the
original defendant's identity). It was not until one year later, in February of
1985, that plaintiff "impleaded" J.P. Schermerhorn & Co. as a defendant and
served process upon the company. Id. at 833, 549 N.E.2d at 669.
The court's use of the term "implead" is probably incorrect since defendants, rather than plaintiffs, typically implead third parties. 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/2-406 (1992) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-406(b) (1991). Further the
Illinois statute speaks of defendants, rather than plaintiffs, bringing third-party
complaints. Id. Finally, the term "implead" is never actually used in the Illinois statute. Id.
The authors suggest that what really occurred procedurally was a 2-1008
substitution of parties. 735 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/2-1008(a), (e) (1992) (ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1008(a), (e) (1991)).
2-1008, entitled, "AbatementChange of Interest or Liability-Substitution of parties," provides:
(A) CHANGE OF INTEREST OR LIABILITY. If by reason of marriage, bankruptcy, assignment, or any other event occurring after the commencement of a cause or proceeding, either before or after judgment, causing
a change or transmission of interest or liability, or by reason of any
person interested coming into existence after commencement of the
action, it becomes necessary or desirable that any person not already a
party before the court, or that any person already a party be made a
party in another capacity, the action does not abate, but on motion an
order may be entered that the proper parties be substituted or added,
and that the cause or proceeding be carried on with the remaining parties and new parties, with or without a change in the title of the cause
(E) SERVICE OF PROCESS. Parties against whom relief is sought, substituted
under subsection (a) hereof, shall be brought in by service of process
Id. A 2-1008 scenario would explain why the original defendant is not found
in the caption and why J.P. Schermerhorn & Co. was added/substituted a year
after filing. Also, it might correspond to plaintiff's later reliance on 2-1008
when attempting to add J.P. Schermerhorn, individually.
Of course, 2-1008 raises an interesting point: given its very liberal nature,
might 2-1008 be used as a "loophole" out of a 2-616(d) problem? Specifically,
2-1008 appears to do away with any statute of limitations problem ("coming
before or after judgment .... ), and second, has a very broad reach ("marriage,
bankruptcy.... or any other event ...."). Id.
89. It is an established principle of corporate law that separate corporate
entities cannot be treated interchangeably. Hoppa, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 836, 549
N.E.2d at 671.
90. The plaintiff argued that "the two companies were 'one and the same'
because they conducted business from the same address, had the same telephone number, and in nearly all other respects were identical." Id. at 836, 549
N.E.2d at 670. Equally compelling, the corporations' respective dissolution and
formation occurred on the same day. Id. at 833, 549 N.E.2d at 669. The court
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for the former enabled the first corporation to avoid legal liability
by dissolving and then reincorporating as a purported separate entity. The court could have neutralized this maneuver by allowing
the complaint to be amended to substitute Schermerhorn for Company. Even if the corporations had been separately incorporated,
i.e., were separate legal entities, the first district still failed to address the real party in interest question: was suit against one corporation in fact suit against both? Similarly curious was the
appellate court's failure to impute a finding of general appearance
to J.P.'s participation in the proceedings as against a long line of
Illinois case law to the contrary. 91
C. Summary
Clearly, confusion exists within the Illinois judiciary regarding
the construction and application of the misnomer provision. Fortunately, the opinions rely on basic principles and repeated themes
which have been applied with some consistency. For the defendant,
the misnomer provision's overriding principle is one of protection
from undue surprise. Specifically, the courts want to be certain
that the action is filed before the expiration of the statute of limitations and that the real party in interest is before them, has notice of
the proceedings, and an adequate opportunity to defend. 92 This
goal requires that the plaintiff properly identify and intend to sue
the real party in interest at an early stage of the lawsuit. The plaintiff must also exercise due diligence in locating and serving that
party.
For the plaintiff, the overriding principle is one of litigation on
the merits rather than dismissal based on procedural technicalities.
To achieve this goal, the misnomer provision should be liberally
construed to avoid exalting form over substance. In practical application, the plaintiff may invoke misnomer to cure only two mistakes: (1) the misspelling or the transposition of common or
surname, or insertion of an erroneous common name; or (2) the
naming of a non-entity, but with such participation in the lawsuit by
the real party in interest as to estop that party from raising the statute of limitations defense. If the plaintiff uses due diligence, the
correction may be made at any time before or after judgment. Any
countered, however, that plaintiff failed to offer sufficient grounds for a finding
that the two companies were one and the same. Id. at 836, 549 N.E.2d at 671.
91. For cases finding that litigant's participation in the proceedings constitutes a general appearance, see The People ex reL. Edward Kazubowski v. Loy
E. Ray, 48 Ill. 2d 413, 272 N.E.2d 225 (Ill. 1971); Margaret B. Lau v. West Towns
Bus Co., 16 Ill. 2d 442, 158 N.E.2d 63 (Ill. 1959); In re Estate of Hertha Zoglaver,
229 Ill. App. 3d 394, 593 N.E.2d 93 (2d Dist. 1992); Antonio Padilla v. Eladio E.
Vazquez, 223 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 586 N.E.2d 309 (1st. Dist. 1991).
92. See supra note 8 for a sampling of "misnomer" cases.
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other error exceeds the scope of the misnomer provision and is subject to the stricter requirements of paragraph 2-616(d).
II.

MISIDENTIFICATION

A.

The Statute

Unlike paragraph 2-401(b), which vests the court with broad
and largely unguided discretion, paragraph 2-616(d) limits the
court's discretion with five conditions, all of which must be met
before the court may allow a post-limitations amendment to relate
back to the filing of the initial complaint. These conditions are:
(1) [T]he time prescribed or limited had not expired when the original action was commenced;
(2)

failure to join the person as a defendant was inadvertent;

(3) service of summons was in fact had upon the person, his or her
agent or partner, as the nature of the defendant made appropriate,
even though he or she was served in the wrong capacity or as agent of
another, or upon a trustee who has title to but no power of management or control over real property constituting a trust of which the
person is a beneficiary;
(4) the person, within the time that the action might have been
brought or the right asserted against him or her, knew that the original
action was pending and that it grew out of a transaction or occurrence
involving or concerning him or her; and
(5) it appears from the original and amended pleadings that the cause
of action asserted in the amended pleading grew out of the same transaction or occurrence set up in the original pleading, even though the
original pleading was defective in that it failed to allege the performance of some act or the existence of some fact or some other matter
which is a necessary condition precedent to the right of recovery when
the condition precedent has in fact been performed, and even though
the person was not named originally as a defendant. For the purpose
of preserving the cause of action under those conditions, an amendment adding the person as a defendant relates back to the date of the
filing of the original pleading so amended.93
Like misnomer, in misidentification cases the complaint must
be filed within the limitations period under condition (1). Unlike
misnomer, the proper defendant also must learn of the action
within the limitations period under condition (2). Under condition
(3), although service is not delimited by the statute of limitations, it
must be achieved on the proper defendant albeit in the wrong capacity, or on his or her agent or partner or upon a trustee. 94 The
only cure for failing to meet conditions (3) and (4) is inadvertence
93. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-616(d)(1)-(5) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-

616(d)(1)-(5)).
94. For a detailed discussion of the agency requirement see inkfra text accompanying notes 140-51 and note 195.
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under condition (2). If conditions (1) through (4) are met, then condition (5) will allow the amended pleading to relate back to the date
of the filing of the original pleading if the amendment grew out of
the same transaction or occurrence as the original pleading. Thus,
misidentification contemplates the post-limitations joinder of an additional defendant if the timing, effort (inadvertence), service,
knowledge and transactional requirements of paragraph 2-616(d)
are met.
Failure to satisfy any of these conditions will meet with one of
three fates. First, if the statute is strictly construed, the error may
be fatal and the cause of action lost, notwithstanding the specific
behavior of either party. 95 Second, if the untimely service is primarily caused by the plaintiff and is deemed "inadvertent," then
the action will survive and the proper party retroactively added to
the complaint. 96 Finally, if the untimely service is primarily caused
by the defendant, either because of name confusion9 7 or litigation
tactics, 98 then an estoppel argument can be asserted to prevent the
defendant from benefiting from its misconduct.99
The purpose of the "who knew what, when, and where" inquiry
of the misidentification provision is to provide a remedy for plaintiffs who mistakenly sue the wrong defendant because of the confusion and/or fusion of the identities that frequently occur in
contemporary personal and business relationships, while at the
same time providing safeguards against undermining the statute of
limitations:
95. See, e.g., Thompson v. Ware, 210 Ill. App. 3d 16, 568 N.E.2d 500 (4th Dist.
1991) (plaintiff served summons on defendant's twin sister and failed to serve
real party in interest before the statute of limitations); Tyler v. J.C. Penney Co.,
145 Ill. App. 3d 967, 496 N.E.2d 323 (4th Dist. 1986) (plaintiff served the business
under its common name and did not learn of the error until two years after the
defendant filed its appearance).
96. See, e.g., Ellis v. Borisek, 220 Ill. App. 3d 48, 580 N.E.2d 899 (3d Dist.
1991) (plaintiff served the owner as an agent of a restaurant which had no legal

existence, but failed to serve the owner individually); Shiner v. Friedman, 161
Ill. App. 3d 73, 513 N.E.2d 862 (1st Dist. 1987) (plaintiff served one partner in a
business and failed to serve his brother, another partner).
97. See, e.g., Bates v. The Wagon Wheel Country Club, Inc., 132 Ill. App. 2d
161, 266 N.E.2d 343 (2d Dist. 1971) (defendant operated under the names

"Wagon Wheel Country Club, Inc." and "Wagon Wheel Enterprises, Inc.";
plaintiff had service on both, but not on "Henry G. Wilson, d/b/a Wagon Wheel

Stables").
98. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Speaker, 126 Ill. 2d 150, 533 N.E.2d 885 (1988) (plaintiff's summons returned by decedent's estate where plaintiff sued the deceased); Evans v. Graber, Inc., 115 Ill. App. 3d 532, 450 N.E.2d 482 (4th Dist.

1983) (plaintiff failed to join a corporation which was separate from defendant
corporation with a similar name).
99. See, e.g., Ingram v. MFA Ins. Co., 18 Ill. App. 3d 560, 309 N.E.2d 690 (2d
Dist. 1974) (defendant objected to service under a trade name even though he
was served as an agent under that name).
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When the defendant has notice from the beginning of the suit of the
claim against it, the reason for statutes of limitations is not as important. Such statutes must be construed in light of their objectives.
Their basic policy is to afford a defendant a fair opportunity to investigate the circumstances upon which liability against him is predicated
while the facts are still accessible [citation omitted]. Statutes of limitations are for preventing delays in asserting claims and to prevent the
asserting of stale claims. It was never intended that such statutes
would be the means by which a corporation could escape liability of a
tort claim against it by confusing its identity through a complex intermingling of its corporation
names and structure with that of other sim100
ilar corporations.
Misidentification most typically occurs when the wrong business entity is served within the statute of limitations but the right
business is not identified until after the statute of limitations has
run. Service on the correct defendant may then be frustrated by a
variety of circumstances, such as: related businesses having confusingly similar names;' 0 ' unrelated businesses having confusingly
similar names; 10 2 an individual engaging in business under both his
or her own name and a different business name; 03 the proper defendant's identity is masked by its licensor's or franchisor's
name; 10 4 a business is in dissolution, 10 5 or has been succeeded by
another business; 10 6 multiple business entities own or control other
100. Bates, 132 Ill. App. 2d at 167, 266 N.E.2d at 348.
101. See, e.g., Behr v. Club Med, Inc., 190 Ill. App. 3d 396, 546 N.E.2d 751 (1st
Dist. 1989) (plaintiff sued "Club Med, Inc." when the proper party was "Club
Mediterranean, S.A.," although both organizations were called Club Med); Evans, 115 Ill. App. 3d 532, 450 N.E.2d 482 (plaintiff failed to join a corporation
which was separate from defendant corporation with a similar name); Bates, 132
Ill. App. 2d 161, 266 N.E.2d 343 (defendant operated under the names "Wagon
Wheel Country Club, Inc." and "Wagon Wheel Enterprises, Inc."; plaintiff had
service on both, but not on "Henry G. Wilson, d/b/a Wagon Wheel Stables").
102. See, e.g., Behr, 190 Ill. App. 3d 396, 546 N.E.2d 751 (plaintiff sued "Club
Med, Inc." where the proper party was "Club Mediterranean, S.A.", although
both organizations were called Club Med).
103. See, e.g., Hoving v. Davies, 159 Ill. App. 3d 106, 512 N.E.2d 729 (1st Dist.
1987) (defendant was listed as Davies (owner of business) but in fact the business was incorporated as "John A. Davies, Inc." when the cause of action accrued); Campbell v. Feuquay, 140 Ill. App. 3d 584, 488 N.E.2d 1111 (5th Dist.
1986) (defendant was sued as "South Roxana Market" and not as "Edith Feuquay d/b/a South Roxana Market" where plaintiff was under the misconception
that the market had a separate legal identity).
104. See, e.g., Greil v. Travelodge Int'l, Inc., 186 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 541 N.E.2d
1288 (1st Dist. 1989) (finding misnomer of franchise when plaintiff served actual
operator but sued operator under advertised name rather than actual name);
Thomson v. McDonald's, Inc., 180 11. App. 3d 984, 536 N.E.2d 760 (1st Dist. 1989)
(finding service on franchisor did not constitute service against franchisee).
105. See, e.g., Suste v. Sterr, 135 Ill. App. 3d 652, 482 N.E.2d 184 (3d Dist.
1985) (finding service on proper defendant in individual capacity was sufficient
service on corporation in dissolution of which defendant was sole proprietor).
106. See, e.g., People's Gas, Light & Coke Co. v. Austin, 147 Ill. App. 3d 26,
497 N.E.2d 790 (1st Dist. 1986) (finding that service on agent of prior corporation
was sufficient service on successor corporation when agent and successor corpo-
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businesses; 10 7 or the suit is filed against a non-entity.10 8
1.

Related Businesses

Suste v. Sterr 0 9 presents a straightforward application of a
misidentification error caused by a confusing business relationship.
The plaintiff filed an eleventh hour complaint for personal injuries
against Sterr, the driver of the car in which the plaintiff was a passenger, Sterr's employer, Keith Clark d/b/a The House of Fine Design, and the driver of the truck that collided with Sterr's
automobile. Seven months later, during discovery, the plaintiff
learned that Clark was the president and sole owner of a corporation named The House of Fine Design, Inc. Three days later, the
plaintiff moved to add this corporation as a defendant although the
actual amended complaint was not filed for seven months after the
statute of limitations had run. Summons was then served on the
corporation's agent, but the court dismissed the corporation because
the amendment had not been filed within the limitations period.
The appellate court reversed, finding that all five conditions of
paragraph 2-616(d) had been satisfied. Condition (1) was satisfied
because the original action had been commenced within the limitations period. Condition (2) was satisfied because the seven month
delay in filing the amended complaint after finding out the true
facts was deemed "reasonable" and "inadvertent" as against the defendant's argument that the plaintiff had not been diligent in confirming the identification of the proper defendant. 110 Condition (3)
was satisfied because Clark originally had been served d/b/a The
House of Fine Design which, at that time, was in dissolution.
Hence, the court found that service had been made on the right person, albeit in the wrong capacity. Condition (4) was satisfied because Clark had been served and, thus, received notice within the
limitations period. Condition (5) was satisfied because the cause of
action against the misidentified defendant arose out of the same
transaction as the cause of action against the properly identified deration misled plaintiff regarding current ownership of property for which gas
service was provided).
107. See, e.g., Behr v. Club Med, Inc., 190 Ill. App. 3d 396, 546 N.E.2d 751 (1st
Dist. 1989) (holding that service on similarly named subsidiary's promoter did
not constitute service on resort operator when plaintiff delayed serving operator); Shiner v. Friedman, 161 Ill. App. 3d 73, 513 N.E.2d 862 (1st Dist. 1987)
(finding proper service on corporation, rather than on partnership, which related back for purposes of the statute of limitations when same principals were
involved in both partnership and corporation).
108. See, e.g., Campbell v. Feuquay, 140 Ill. App. 3d 584, 488 N.E.2d 1111 (5th
Dist. 1986) (finding that shopper's act in naming grocery store rather than individual owner was inadvertent).
109. 135 Ill. App. 3d 652, 482 N.E.2d 184 (3d Dist. 1985).
110. This may be done by referring to the State's Annual Registry of Corporations. See Suste, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 654, 482 N.E.2d at 184.
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fendant. Thus, the court concluded that the amendment adding the
proper defendant could relate back to the filing of the original
111
action.
2. Representative Actions
Another major area under which misidentification issues arise
is the representative action. 112 Typically, a suit will be filed against
a person who, unknown to the plaintiff, has died. If the plaintiff
does not know of the decedent's death and, thus, fails to serve the
decedent's representative before the statute of limitations runs, the
amendment will fail based on the principles that: (i) suit against a
non-entity is void ab initio and, therefore, any amendments would
have nothing to which to relate back, 113 and/or (ii) representatives
cannot be substituted for previously named parties, but rather,
are treated as entirely new and different parties whose joinder
must independently comport with the five misidentification
114
conditions.
Several courts have attempted to mitigate the harsh results attendant the strict dichotomy between decedent and representative
16
5
by employing such equitable concepts as estoppel1 and waiver
in order to allow the action to proceed despite untimely service
upon the representative. The Illinois Supreme Court case of
Vaughn v. Speaker 1 17 presents an illustration of this current trend.
The plaintiff sued a defendant who had died a few months before
the complaint was filed. The plaintiff did not become aware of the
decedent's death and, hence, did not move to amend the complaint
111. For similar results see Yedor v. Centre Properties, Inc., 173 Ill. App. 3d
132, 527 N.E.2d 414 (1st Dist. 1988).
112. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Speaker, 126 Ill. 2d 150, 533 N.E.2d 885 (1988) (refusing to allow substitution of executor for defendant who died a few months prior
to institution of suit, but remanding for a determination of whether executor
should be estopped to assert statute of limitations as a bar); Newey v. Newey,

215 Ill. App. 3d 993, 576 N.E.2d 137 (1st Dist. 1991) (holding that failure to name

representative was not inadvertent when son knew his father was the benefici-

ary); McCammant v. McCarthy, 202 Ill. App. 3d 812, 560 N.E.2d 432 (3d Dist.
1990) (dismissing executor from suit where plaintiff sought to amend after statute of limitations when defendant died prior to plaintiff filing suit); Turner v.

Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 180 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 536 N.E.2d 806 (1st Dist. 1989)

(finding that plaintiff failed to serve trustee within statute of limitations and,
accordingly, the beneficiary did not have notice, but also finding that defendant

waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to assert it for more than
three and one-half years); Lakeview Trust & Savings Bank v. Estrada, 134 Ill.
App. 3d 792, 480 N.E.2d 1312 (1st Dist. 1985) (finding no service on corporation

when individual officer was named and served in his individual capacity).
113. See supra note 112 for cases which discuss non-entity and dismissal.
114. See supra note 112 for cases which discuss substitution of parties.
115. Marcus, 224 Ill. App. 3d 464, 586 N.E.2d 694.

116. Turner, 180 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 536 N.E.2d 806.
117. 126 Ill. 2d 150, 533 N.E.2d 885 (1988).
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to name the decedent's estate as the defendant, until after the statute of limitations had run. The defendant then moved for summary
judgment pursuant to paragraph 2-616(d). The plaintiff argued that
the error was a misnomer and that the court should allow the decedent's estate to be substituted for the decedent. The Illinois
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that even though the estate was
the legal successor to certain rights and liabilities of the decedent,
the decedent and his estate were wholly distinct legal entities. As a
result, the substitution of the estate for the decedent was not the
correction of a misnomer, but rather, was a post-limitations joinder
in violation of 2-616(d). Since the plaintiff had not complied with
the conditions of paragraph 2-616(d), the estate could not be joined.
However, the court remanded the case for a determination of
whether the defendant had engaged in such conduct during the litigation that it should be estopped to assert the statute of limitations
18
bar.
B.

Case Controversy

Case controversy arises in two contexts: the construction of the
inadvertence, agency, and knowledge and the judicial infusion of
estoppel as a common law cure for plaintiff's failure strictly to meet
these statutory requirements.
1.

Inadvertence

Condition (2) of paragraph 2-616(d) requires that the plaintiff's
failure to join the proper defendant be inadvertent."19 Courts have
variously construed inadvertence to mean "not turning the mind to
a matter, heedless, negligent, inattentive,' 20 as opposed to purposeful conduct intended to strike a strategic advantage 12 ' but
which results in a legal or factual miscalculation. 122 Assertions of
inadvertence have prevailed where the plaintiff's ignorance was
deemed reasonable, 1 23 or negligent, 12 4 or where the plaintiff did not
118. Id. at 167, 533 N.E.2d at 892. For a detailed discussion of estoppel, see
infra notes 164-87 and accompanying text.
119. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-616(d)(2) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2616(d)(2)).
120. Evans v. Graber, Inc., 115 Ill. App. 3d 532, 535, 450 N.E.2d 482, 484 (4th
Dist. 1983).
121. See, e.g., Behr v. Club Med, Inc., 190 Ill.
App. 3d 396, 403-04, 546 N.E.2d
751, 756-57 (1st Dist. 1989) (refusing to allow amendment after statute of limitations when plaintiff reasonably should have known, 17 months earlier, that resort owner was proper defendant).
122. See, e.g., Newey v. Newey, 215 Ill. App. 3d 993, 998, 576 N.E.2d 137, 141
(1st Dist. 1991) (refusing to allow amendment to name trustee after statute of
limitations ran when son knew father was beneficiary under trust).
123. See, e.g., Yedor v. Centre Properties, Inc., 173 Ill. App. 3d 132, 527 N.E.2d
414 (1st Dist. 1988) (allowing amendment when real party in interest was actu-
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learn the identification of the proper defendant until after the statute of limitations had lapsed 125 but acted with due diligence in filing
the corrective amendment. 126 Conversely, courts agree that if the
plaintiff had timely knowledge of the defendant's identity and still
failed to amend the complaint, then such inaction would not qualify
127
as inadvertence.
Inadvertence issues arise primarily where a defendant's business relationships and identities are so intermingled and fused that
the plaintiff cannot reasonably determine the appropriate defendant until discovery has revealed the confusion. Because of the eleventh hour nature of many cases, discovery frequently does not
commence until after the statute of limitations has run. Delayed
service of process may then be further exacerbated when the improper defendant perpetuates the error by failing to raise the misidentification issue in its answer and, instead, appears and defends
under the wrong name or in the wrong capacity. 128 Where such
defensive conduct is itself inadvertent or a strategic ploy to delay
the plaintiff's identification of the appropriate defendant until after
ally served); Evans, 115 Ill. App. 3d 532, 450 N.E.2d 482 (allowing amendment
when plaintiff named Graber, Inc., instead of Graber Construction Company
where Sam Graber, who owned both corporations, misled plaintiff about identity of proper defendant).
124. See, e.g., Shiner v. Friedman, 161 Ill. App. 3d 73, 513 N.E.2d 862 (1st Dist.
1987) (allowing amendment when plaintiff named corporation instead of partnership where same brothers owned both corporations); Suste v. Sterr, 135 Ill.
App. 3d 652, 482 N.E.2d 184 (3d Dist. 1985) (allowing amendment when plaintiff
was named sole proprietor instead of corporation which had same individual as
its sole shareholder).
125. See, e.g., Shiner, 161 Ill. App. 3d 73, 513 N.E.2d 862 (allowing amendment when plaintiff named corporation instead of partnership where same
brothers owned both entities); Suste, 135 Ill. App. 3d 652, 482 N.E.2d 184 (allowing amendment when plaintiff named sole proprietor instead of corporation); Evans, 115 Ill. App. 3d 532, 450 N.E.2d 482 (allowing amendment when
plaintiff promptly moved to amend upon discovering proper defendant).
126. See, e.g., Campbell v. Feuquay, 140 Ill. App. 3d 584, 488 N.E.2d 1111 (5th
Dist. 1986) (allowing amendment when plaintiff named grocery store as a defendant and served Feuquay instead of naming Feuquay "doing business as" the
grocery store).
127. Behr v. Club Med, Inc., 190 Ill. App. 3d 396, 546 N.E.2d 751 (1st Dist.
1989). As a corollary, courts generally agree that inadvertence will not serve as
a cure where "defendant's true identity is known to plaintiff prior to the expiration of the limitations period and plaintiff fails to act appropriately," Yedor, 173
Ill. App. 3d at 139, 527 N.E.2d at 419, or where plaintiff's delay in moving to
correct the pleadings is unreasonable. Behr, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 402-03, 546
N.E.2d at 756 (17 month delay from date plaintiff knew proper defendant, three
year delay from date of accident). But see Anane v. Pettibone Corp., 203 Ill.
App. 3d 121, 560 N.E.2d 1088 (1st Dist. 1990) (timely notice but plaintiff failed to
amend because of defendant's concealment).
128. See, e.g., Campbell, 140 Ill. App. 3d 584, 488 N.E.2d 1111 (allowing plaintiff to amend complaint when plaintiff served defendant in wrong capacity; defendant failed to raise misidentification and actually confirmed plaintiff's belief
that right party was named by the way defendant answered discovery
questions).
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the statute of limitations has run,129 most courts have permitted the
130
post-limitations joinder of the appropriate defendant.
The first case to address misidentification problems attendant
complex business relationships was Bates v. The Wagon Wheel
Country Club, Inc. 131 The plaintiff was injured on the premises of
the Wagon Wheel Lodge Hotel in Rockton, Illinois. Shortly before
the running of the statute of limitations, the plaintiff commenced
an action against the Wagon Wheel Lodge Hotel and served summons upon Maurice S. Hannon as its agent. When no responsive
pleading was filed by the defendant, the plaintiff obtained a default
judgment. On the same day, the plaintiff was informed by the attorney for Wagon Wheel Country Club, Inc., and Wagon Wheel Enterprises, Inc., that the wrong defendant (Wagon Wheel Lodge
Hotel) had been sued. The plaintiff then sought to amend the complaint to add Wagon Wheel Country Club, Inc., and Wagon Wheel
Enterprises, Inc. The new defendants objected to the amendment
on the grounds that they had not been added until after the statute
of limitations had run. The appellate court upheld the amendment
primarily because it was so impressed with the impenetrability of
the corporate morass behind which the true defendants' identity
had been concealed:
[T]he corporate complexities that evolve around the Wagon Wheel
Lodge are, to say the least, unusual .... [T]he operation at the Wagon
Wheel Lodge Hotel was conducted by nine different corporations: The
Wagon Wheel Lodge, Inc.; Wagon Wheel Country Club, Inc.; Wagon
Wheel Enterprises, Inc.; Walter Williamson's Wagon Wheel, Inc.; Williamson's Wagon Wheel Theater, Inc.; Williamson's Wagon Wheel Resort, Inc.; Williamson's Inn, Inc.; W.W., Inc.; and F.N.I. Corp. Six of the
corporations even used the name "Wagon Wheel" in their corporate
title. It is understandable that plaintiff might have difficulty in determining who was the proper party defendant. Had the difference in the
names of the corporations been more apparent, and their corporate
structure more distinct so their identity could be readily ascertained,
the diligence of the plaintiff in ascertaining such identity would have
more import. However, under the circumstances, it was no doubt difficult for the plaintiff to properly identify the correct corporation. This
court feels that the mistake as to the identify [sic] of the correct defendants was caused or inducted [sic] more by the actions of their agent
1 32
and officers than by any lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiff.
129. See, e.g., Evans v. Graber, Inc., 115 Ill. App. 3d 532, 450 N.E.2d 482 (4th
Dist. 1983) (allowing amendment when defendant refused to answer plaintiff's
questions regarding proper defendant).
130. Ellis v. Borisek, 220 Ill. App. 3d 48, 580 N.E.2d 899 (3d Dist. 1991) (allowing amendment to name individual who was served as agent for corporation
in dissolution); Shiner v. Friedman, 161 Ill. App. 3d 73, 513 N.E.2d 862 (1st Dist.
1987) (allowing amendment to name partnership in place of corporation); but
see Behr, 190 Ill. App. 3d 396, 546 N.E.2d 751 (disallowing plaintiff's post-limitations joinder of the proper defendant).
131. 132 Ill. App. 2d 161, 266 N.E.2d 343 (2d Dist. 1971).
132. Id. at 166, 266 N.E.2d at 347.
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The Bates court concluded that statutes of limitation were never
intended to be a means by which a corporation could escape liability
133
of a tort claim against it.
Similarly, in Evans v. Graber,Inc.,134 the plaintiff sued Graber,

Inc., for negligence and served summons on its president, Sam Graber. In response to an interrogatory asking if the defendant was
correctly named in the lawsuit and, if not, to name the correct defendant, Graber, Inc., answered, "[t]here is a corporation named
Graber, Inc. Whether the above is correctly named as a defendant
1' 3 5
in this lawsuit is a matter for the Plaintiff's determination.
Thereafter, the defendant repeatedly refused to comply with discovery requests seeking to determine the identification of the
proper defendant. It was not until Sam Graber's deposition that the
plaintiff was able to elicit the fact that the proper defendant was
actually Graber Construction Company. The court allowed the
post-limitations amendment in part because of Graber, Inc.'s refusal
to identify Graber Construction Company.
In Campbell v. Feuquay,13 6 the plaintiff sued South Roxana

Market, a grocery store, in a personal injury suit. The defendant
appeared and answered as South Roxana Market and used that
name throughout the pleadings and discovery. After the statute of
limitations had run, the plaintiff learned that the South Roxana
Market was actually an assumed name used by its owner, Edith
Feuquay, and that it did not have a separate legal identity. The
plaintiff then amended the complaint to name Edith Feuquay d/b/a
South Roxana Market who, in turn, moved to dismiss. In holding
for the plaintiff, the court pointed out that the defendant never submitted deposition testimony, interrogatory answers, documents, affidavits, or other evidence that firmly established the proper
identification or actual status of South Roxana Market. The court
stated that "[w]hile defendant may have had no duty to do so, we
observe that it is common practice for defendants to disclose the
proper parties defendant in their answers or in response to discov' 137
ery requests comparable to those propounded in this case."
This line of cases13 8 demonstrates that related commercial en133. Id. at 166-67, 266 N.E.2d at 347-48. See supra text accompanying note
100 for the court's quoted opinion.
134. 115 Ill. App. 3d 532, 450 N.E.2d 482 (4th Dist. 1983).
135. Id. at 533, 450 N.E.2d at 483.
136. 140 Ill. App. 3d 584, 488 N.E.2d 1111 (5th Dist. 1986).
137. Id. at 589, 488 N.E.2d at 1114. The defendant was additionally chastised
for failing to comply with the requirement to file a certificate with the county
clerk disclosing the names of the person or persons owning, conducting, or
transacting business under an assumed name. Id.
138. Yedor v. Centre Properties, Inc., 173 Ill. App. 3d 132, 527 N.E.2d 414 (1st
Dist. 1988); Shiner v. Friedman, 161 Ill. App. 3d 73, 513 N.E.2d 862 (1st Dist.
1987); Campbell, 140 Ill.
App. 3d 584, 488 N.E.2d 1111; Suste v. Sterr, 135 Ill.
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terprises will not be able to insulate themselves from lawsuits by
adopting evasive hide-and-seek litigation tactics to outrun the statute of limitations, nor will such defendants be able to benefit from
material omissions in pleadings and discovery. Rather, the burden
of timely disclosure of a known misidentification error clearly shifts
to the defendant. Further, the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's omission will be protected as "excusable ignorance.139
2. Agency
Condition (3) of paragraph 2-616(d) requires, in part, that service be obtained "upon the person, his or her agent or partner...
even though... served in the wrong capacity or as agent of another
.... "140 The finding of an agency relationship between the person
served and the proper defendant is the most frequently litigated
issue under condition (3).141 Generally, if an appropriately designated agent is served and the proper party defendant had knowl1 42
edge of the suit before the expiration of the statute of limitations,
then the post-limitations amendment will be allowed. If, however,
an agency relationship is not found, 43 then the post-limitations
amendment will not be allowed notwithstanding the proper defend44
ant's actual knowledge of the suit.'
Suste v. Sterr 45 illustrates a straightforward treatment of
agency under condition (3). The plaintiff filed an eleventh hour
App. 3d 652, 482 N.E.2d 184 (3d Dist. 1985); Evans, 115 Ill. App. 3d 532, 450
N.E.2d 482; Bates v. The Wagon Wheel Country Club, Inc., 132 Ill. App. 2d 161,
266 N.E.2d 343 (2d Dist. 1971).
139. See supra note 138 for cases discussing defendant's burden and plaintiff's excusable ignorance.
140. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-616(d)(3) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2616(d)(3)).
141. A sampling of agency based cases would include: Cohen Furniture Co. v.
Sumpter, 197 Ill. App. 3d 751, 555 N.E.2d 60 (4th Dist. 1990) (vacating a default
judgment against employer named as corporation but which was actually sole
proprietorship); Thomson v. McDonald's, Inc., 180 Ill. App. 3d 984, 536 N.E.2d
760 (1st Dist. 1989) (finding franchisor was not the agent of franchisee for service); Gibson v. Russann, Ltd., 179 Ill. App. 3d 208, 534 N.E.2d 449 (1st Dist.
1989) (finding franchisor was not the agent of franchisee for service); and Suste,
135 Ill. App. 3d 652, 482 N.E.2d 184 (allowing amendment from individual defendant to corporate defendant).
142. See, e.g., Ellis v. Borisek, 220 Ill. App. 3d 48, 580 N.E.2d 899 (3d Dist.
1991) (allowing amendment naming individual who was served as agent of corporation in dissolution); Shiner, 161 Ill. App. 3d 73, 513 N.E.2d 862 (allowing
amendment naming partnership instead of corporation where real party in interest was served with summons).
143. Gibson, 179 Ill. App. 3d 208, 534 N.E.2d 449 (finding no agency relationship between franchisor and franchisee); Thomson, 180 Ill. App. 3d 984, 536
N.E.2d 760 (finding no agency relationship between franchisor and franchisee).
144. See supra note 143 for cases discussing defendant's knowledge and
dismissal.
145. Suste, 135 Ill. App. 3d 652, 482 N.E.2d 184.
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suit for injuries arising from a car accident against Sterr, the driver,
and Clark, d/b/a The House of Fine Design, as Sterr's employer.
During discovery, plaintiff learned that Clark was the president
and sole owner of a business named "House of Fine Design, Inc."
which was also Sterr's actual employer. Seven months later, the
plaintiff amended the complaint to name "House of Fine Design,
Inc." as a defendant. However, the court dismissed the amendment
because it was not filed within the limitations period. The appellate
court reversed the dismissal, in part, because at the time of service
"House of Fine Design, Inc." was in dissolution. Since corporate
officers have the authority to wind up the affairs of a corporation in
dissolution, 146 and since Clark was the corporation's president, the
court held that service had been obtained on the right person, Clark
d/b/a House of Design, even though Clark had been served in the
147
wrong capacity.
On the other hand, the first district rejected agency arguments
1 49
in Gibson v. Russann, Ltd.148 and Thomson v. McDonald's, Inc.
In both cases, the plaintiffs filed personal injury actions naming and
serving the franchisors rather than the franchisees of the premises
on which they were injured. In both cases, the plaintiffs attempted
to amend their complaints based on the argument that service upon
the franchisor should constitute service upon the franchisee. The
courts rejected these arguments finding, instead, that absent evidence of common ownership or operation, or fraudulent concealment,150 the franchisor could not be deemed the franchisee's agent
for service of process purposes. 151
3. Knowledge
Condition (4) requires that the proper defendant "within the
time that the action might have been brought or the right asserted
1 52
against him or her, knew that the original action was pending."'
The decisions in the pertinent case law hinge on the application of
the real party in interest test. Specifically, if the real party in interest was sued within but served after the statute of limitations, then
146.
5/17.05
147.
148.

See The Illinois Business Corporation Act, 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1.01(1992) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, paras. 1.01-17.05 (1991)).
Suste, 135 Ill.
App. 3d 652, 482 N.E.2d 184.
179 Ill.
App. 3d 208, 534 N.E.2d 449 (1st Dist. 1989).

149. 180 Ill. App. 3d 984, 536 N.E.2d 760 (1st Dist. 1989).
150. See supra notes 148-49 for cases which held that service on franchisor is
not service on franchisee.
151. Id.
152. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-616(d)(4) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-

616(d)(4)).
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the amendment will be characterized as misnomer and allowed. 153
If, however, the complaint originally named the wrong defendant
but subsequently was amended and served on the real party in interest after the statute of limitations, then the error will be characterized as misidentification and result in the amendment's
dismissal. This line of cases equates knowledge of the action with
service, and requires that service take place within the statute of
limitations1i 4
For example, in Thielke v. Osman Construction Co., 15 5 the

complaint was filed within but served after the limitations period.
The court found that the real party in interest had been sued within
the statute of limitations, even though its name had been misspelled
and, therefore, the post-limitations service was permissible under
15 7
paragraph 2-401(b). 156 Conversely, in Leonard v. City of Streator
158
and Hoving v. Davies, the plaintiffs filed eleventh hour dramshop actions against taverns. In both cases, the taverns had been
owned as unincorporated entities during the statute of limitations
period, but process had been served upon their respective agents
after the statute expired. The courts held that because the defendants had been sued in their individual rather than corporate capacities, the wrong defendants had been sued and, therefore, the real
defendants had not received knowledge of the suit within the limitations period. These cases did not apply the real party in interest
test which would have treated these errors as misnomers and permitted the amendments. Rather, the courts characterized the errors as misidentifications and dismissed the actions because service
and, therefore, knowledge, had not occurred within the limitations
period.
This restriction on the timing of service to the limitations
period has been upheld even where the plaintiff proceeded with due
diligence to amend and serve the complaint and even where the
other criteria of paragraph 2-616(d) have been satisfied. Although
Illinois law requires filing of the complaint within the limitations
period, 159 the timeliness of service traditionally has been defined by
153. Thielke v. Osman Constr. Co., 129 Ill. App. 3d 948, 473 N.E.2d 574 (1st
Dist. 1985). For a further discussion of the Thielke case, see supra notes 14-15
and accompanying text.
154. Hoving v. Davies, 159 Ill. App. 3d 106, 512 N.E.2d 729 (1st Dist. 1987);
Leonard v. City of Streator, 113 Ill. App. 3d 404, 447 N.E.2d 489 (3d Dist. 1983).
155. Thielke, 129 Ill. App. 3d 948, 473 N.E.2d 574.
156. Id. at 952, 473 N.E.2d at 577.
157. Leonard, 113 Ill. App. 3d 404, 447 N.E.2d 489.
158. Hoving, 159 Ill. App. 3d 106, 512 N.E.2d 729.
159. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-616(d)(2) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2616(d)(2)).
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due diligence, not the statute of limitations. i 6° Thus, courts which
have required knowledge within the statute of limitations have effectively eliminated due diligence as the measure of the timeliness
of service. In effect, these courts have engrafted the timing provisions of condition (4) onto condition (3) and, in doing so, have
merged the two provisions as if they addressed the same conduct of
the plaintiff.
This unusual limitation on the timeliness of service raises three
questions about condition (4)'s construction. First, is it borne out on
the face of the statute? The answer to this question is an indisputable no. Condition (4) calls for knowledge within the statute of limitations. Condition (3) calls for service, but does not delimit it by
any period of time. Therefore, the current construction of condition (4) cannot be justified as being facially required, nor is it consistent with the ordinary meaning of the statute's language that
knowledge must be defined exclusively by service, since knowledge
can be obtained by means other than service.
Second, is this limiting construction rational, i.e., does it serve
the purpose for which the statute was enacted? The misidentification statute was enacted to provide relief for plaintiffs who sued the
real party in interest and to protect defendants who were not sued
within the statute of limitations. Too broad a construction of this
statutory plan provides a windfall for plaintiffs who invoke it as a
cure-all for a variety of errors not contemplated by the statutory
scheme. Too narrow a construction provides a windfall for defendants who assert it as a defense to procedural infractions intended to
deprive a plaintiff of his or her day in court. Clearly, the current
construction of condition (4) benefits defendants because it restricts
service to the statute of limitations period. This construction is particularly punitive in light of the fact that many of the misidentifica1 61
tion cases are eleventh hour filings.
Is there any reason why this category of plaintiff should be singled out to comply with a shorter service period than any other
group of plaintiffs under Illinois law? The purpose of measuring
160. See ILL. S. CT. RULE 103(b) (1984) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 103(b)
(1991)). See supra note 11 for a discussion of Rule 103(b).
161. See, e.g., Knowles v. Mid-West Automation Sys., Inc., 211 Ill. App. 3d
682, 570 N.E.2d 484 (1st Dist. 1991) (complaint filed six days before expiration of
the statute of limitations); Barbour v. Fred Berglund & Sons, Inc., 208 Ill. App.
3d 644, 567 N.E.2d 509 (1st Dist. 1990) (complaint filed three days before expiration of the statute of limitations); Greil v. Travelodge Int'l, Inc., 186 Ill. App. 3d
1061, 541 N.E.2d 1288 (1st Dist. 1989) (complaint filed six days before expiration
of the statute of limitations); Turner v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 180 Ill. App.
3d 1022, 536 N.E.2d 806 (1st Dist. 1989) (complaint filed on the expiration day);
Yedor v. Centre Properties, Inc., 173 Ill. App. 3d 132, 527 N.E.2d 414 (1st Dist.
1988) (complaint filed eight days before expiration of the statute of limitations);
Thielke v. Osman Constr. Co., 129 Ill. App. 3d 948, 473 N.E.2d 574 (1st Dist.
1985) (complaint filed nine days before expiration of the statute of limitations).
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the timeliness of service by due diligence is to require a plaintiff to
prosecute the suit actively, whereas the statute of limitations is intended to bar a plaintiff's access to judicial redress if the complaint
is not timely filed. It is well established that procedural rules are
supposed to assist in the prosecution of substantive rights, not
abridge, modify or enlarge them. 16 2 A rule which extinguishes a
plaintiff's access to judicial recourse when the complaint otherwise
qualifies, not only raises equal protection questions, but also, is arguably an invalid exercise of legislative authority to promulgate
rules of procedure. This dilemma can easily be avoided by broadening the circumstances that give rise to "knowledge," and/or by allowing "knowledge" to occur subject to due diligence, rather than
solely as a consequence of service.
Third, is there any other justification for delimiting service to
the statute of limitations period? Other than the efficiencies offered by a clear rule cutting off plaintiff's judicial recourse, this
construction flies in the face of paragraph 1-106 of the Illinois Code
of Civil Procedure which provides that its rules "shall be liberally
construed, to the end that controversies may be speedily and finally
determined according to the substantive rights of the parties."'16 3
The principle encompassed in this provision is based on the value
judgment that procedural rules should serve as instruments for the
implementation of substantive rights and should not otherwise
modify or extinguish such rights. Hence, a strong argument can be
made that the current construction of condition (4) violates the
equal protection clauses of the Illinois and federal constitutions, exceeds legislative authority to promulgate rules of procedure, and vi64
olates the policies underlying all of paragraph 2-616(d).1
162. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 US.C. 2072 (1988); see also Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
163. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-106 (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 1-106).
"Code pleading was adopted in this state because procedural pitfalls of common
law pleading often denied litigants an opportunity to have their differences determined on the merits." Greil, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 1065, 541 N.E.2d at 1291.
164. Although not expressly stated, this line of cases seems to derive from
the United States Supreme Court case of Time v. Schiavone, 477 U.S. 30 (1987).
In Schiavone, the Supreme Court held in favor of strict application of Rule
15(c)'s elements. Specifically, (1) the amended complaint had to arise out of the
same conduct set forth in the original complaint, (2) the newly added party had
to be the proper party, and (3) the newly added party had to receive actual
notice of the action before the expiration of the statute of limitations. 477 U.S.
at 30-31; see also Worthington v. Wilson, 790 F. Supp. 829, 835 (N.D. Ill. 1992)
(holding relation back does not apply where plaintiff attempted to add three
defendants described only as "three unknown police officers"). Simply put,
failure to satisfy any one of these elements in a misidentification claim would
result in a dismissal of the amended complaint.
After Schiavone, numerous commentators and Advisory Committee members of Rule 15 criticized the decision, arguing that its strict construction and
application clearly went against FED. R. CIV. P. 8's "liberalized pleading" objective. Consequently, in 1991, under the authority of the Advisory Committee,
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Estoppel

In the last twenty years, a number of cases have invoked equitable estoppel to either confirm or defeat a misidentification case. 165
This line of cases breaks down into three categories: (1) cases which
use estoppel to cure a misidentification defect; 166 (2) cases which
use estoppel to demonstrate plaintiff's compliance with paragraph
2-616(d); 167 and (3) cases which reject the use of estoppel as a cure
168
for a misidentification defect.
a.

Use of Estoppel to Cure Misidentification Defects
The Illinois Supreme Court endorsed the estoppel argument in

Vaughn v. Speaker.16 9 Vaughn was a representative action in which

the plaintiffs did not learn that they had sued a deceased person
until after the running of the statute of limitations at which time
they attempted to substitute the executor for the deceased. The
trial court dismissed the case on the grounds that the deceased and
the executor were separate legal entities since they could not exist
simultaneously. Hence, the complaint was a nullity since it was
filed against a decedent, leaving the untimely filed amendment
Rule 15(c) was amended to counteract the ruling in Schiavone. See Lawrence
A. Epter, An Un-Fortune-Ate Decision: The Aftermath of the Supreme Court's
Eradication of the Relation-Back Doctrine, 17 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 713 (1990);
Nathan M. Gundy, II, Schiavone v. Fortune: A Clarification of the Relation
Back Doctrine, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 499 (1987). For an example of a federal
court applying the more liberal version of 15(c), see Hensley v. Soo-Line R.R.
Co., 777 F. Supp. 1421, 1424 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (if an added party did not receive
notice within the statute, relation back may still occur if a "sufficient identity of
interest exists between the new and original defendants"). See also Foley v.
Chicago, Cent. & Pac. R.R., No. 90 C 20187, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4683 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 27, 1992); Freeman v. Chicago Police, No. 90 C 3101, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7347 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 1991).
165. See Vaughn v. Speaker, 126 Ill. 2d 150, 533 N.E.2d 885 (1988); Ellis v.
Borisek, 220 Ill. App. 3d 48, 580 N.E.2d 899 (3d Dist. 1991); Anane v. Pettibone
Corp., 203 Ill. App. 3d 121, 560 N.E.2d 1088 (1st Dist. 1990); McCammant v. McCarthy, 202 Ill. App. 3d 812, 560 N.E.2d 432 (3d Dist. 1990); Thomson v. McDonald's, Inc., 180 Ill. App. 3d 984, 536 N.E.2d 760 (1st Dist. 1989); Shiner v.
Friedman, 161 Ill. App. 3d 73, 513 N.E.2d 862 (1st Dist. 1987); Campbell v. Feuquay, 140 Ill. App. 3d 584, 488 N.E.2d 1111 (5th Dist. 1986); Evans v. Graber, Inc.,
115 Ill. App. 3d 532, 450 N.E.2d 482 (4th Dist. 1983); Ingram v. MFA Ins. Co., 18
Ill. App. 3d 560, 309 N.E.2d 690 (2d Dist. 1974); Bates v. The Wagon Wheel Country Club, Inc., 132 Ill. App. 2d 161, 266 N.E.2d 343 (2d Dist. 1971).
166. Vaughn, 126 Ill. 2d 150, 533 N.E.2d 885; Ellis, 220 Ill. App. 3d 48, 580
N.E.2d 899; Shiner, 161 Ill. App. 3d 73, 513 N.E.2d 862; Ingram, 18 Ill. App. 3d
560, 309 N.E.2d 690.
167. Anane, 203 Ill. App. 3d 121, 560 N.E.2d 1088; Campbell, 140 Ill. App. 3d
584, 488 N.E.2d 1111; Evans, 115 Ill. App. 3d 532, 450 N.E.2d 482; Bates, 132 Ill.
App. 2d 161, 266 N.E.2d 343.
168. McCammant, 202 Ill. App. 3d 812, 560 N.E.2d 432; Thomson, 180 Ill. App.
3d 984, 536 N.E.2d 760.
169. Vaughn, 126 Ill. 2d 150, 533 N.E.2d 885.
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nothing to which to relate back.170 The Illinois Supreme Court
agreed with the district and appellate courts' findings that the case
failed both the misnomer and misidentification tests. However, it
found that an issue of fact existed as to whether the defendants had
"lulled plaintiffs into a false sense of security, thereby causing them
to delay the assertion of their rights,"'1 71 and, thus, were estopped to
assert the statute of limitations as a defense. 172 The court found
that the combination of the insurer's concession of liability, payment of the property damage claim, offer of $15,000 to settle the
personal injury claim, and extensive negotiations with the plaintiffs
could have induced the plaintiffs to delay filing suit. Accordingly,
the court remanded the case with instructions that the trier of fact
apply a substantial factor test to determine if the plaintiffs' reliance
173
had been detrimental.
b. Use of Estoppel to Demonstrate Compliance with Paragraph
2-616(d)
In Anane v. Pettibone Corp17 4 the plaintiff had originally filed a
products liability action against Pettibone Corporation alleging that
a machine bearing the Pettibone name was responsible for her husband's death in a factory accident. The plaintiff did not learn, until
two years into discovery and after the defendant's ultimate filing
for bankruptcy, that the real manufacturer of the machine had
been American Process Systems Corp. ("American"), with which
Pettibone had entered into an indemnification agreement. This
agreement included notification and cooperation clauses between
the companies in the event of a lawsuit.' 75 In accordance with the
agreement, Pettibone provided American with notice and a copy of
the plaintiff's complaint. Thereafter, counsel for both companies
met to discuss the suit. Between the filing of the complaint and
Pettibone's filing for bankruptcy, Pettibone appeared, answered,
participated in discovery, refused to correct or disclose that the
name of the machine's real manufacturer was American, or to
implead American as a third party defendant, or to implicate American in any way. Upon learning of American's role in the manufacture of the machine, the plaintiff filed a fourth amended complaint
170. Id. at 155, 533 N.E.2d at 887. For the lower court decision, see Vaughn v.
Speaker, 156 Ill. App. 3d 962, 509 N.E.2d 1084 (3d Dist. 1987).
171. Vaughn, 126 Ill. 2d at 156, 533 N.E.2d at 887.
172. See supra note 47 for the Illinois Supreme Court's articulation of the six
elements of estoppel; see also ILLINOIS LAW & PRACTICE, Estoppel 22, at 83

(1956) (outlining the elements of estoppel).
173. Vaughn, 126 Ill. 2d at 167, 533 N.E.2d at 892.
174. 203 Ill. App. 3d 121, 560 N.E.2d 1088 (1st Dist. 1990).
175. Although this agreement was subsequently terminated, the opinion did
not discuss the effect of the termination on this case. Id. at 124, 560 N.E.2d at
1090.
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naming American as an additional defendant. That complaint was
dismissed as time-barred. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that in
combination with Pettibone as its agent, American had engaged in
conduct sufficient to estop it to assert the statute of limitations bar.
The court agreed:
In the present case, (1) the Pettibone nameplate concealed that American was the machine's manufacturer; (2) American knew that the representation of Pettibone as the manufacturer was untrue; (3) plaintiff
did not know that Pettibone was not the manufacturer; (4) American
should have expected that the nameplate would have been relied upon
by the plaintiff; (5) plaintiff relied upon the nameplate and diligently
pursued discovery; and (6) plaintiff would be prejudiced if American is
permitted to deny that it manufactured the product. Accordingly, we
find that American is estopped from asserting the defense of the statute of limitations as a bar to plaintiff's cause of action ...

[g]iven the

parties' contractual agreement, we conclude that Pettibone was an
agent for the purpose of service of process upon American [citation
omitted]. Pettibone was held out to the public as manufacturer of the
machine. Defendant never submitted sufficient answers to interrogatories, an affidavit, or documents in responses to plaintiff's requests.
Plaintiff's efforts to ascertain the identity of the manufacturer were
reasonable [citation omitted]. Any mistake as to the identity of the
person who should have been named as the proper party defendant
was induced,
if not caused, by the representations of Pettibone [citation
176
omitted].
Finally, and almost as an afterthought, the court found that the
plaintiff had otherwise complied with all five elements of para177
graph 2-616(d).
Two additional cases, Evans v. Graber, Inc.178 and Campbell v.
Feuquay179 implicitly utilized the estoppel concept to support the
plaintiffs' misidentification defenses without expressly referring to
estoppel as an independent basis for their holdings. In Evans, the
improperly designated defendant, Graber, Inc., participated in discovery under that incorrect designation and repeatedly refused to
answer interrogatories requesting the identification of the correct
defendant or other persons who would have knowledge of the accident. Graber, Inc.'s president, Sam Graber, did not disclose this information until two years later when faced with direct and
persistent questioning at his deposition. Immediately thereafter,
the plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to name the appropriate defendant, Graber Construction Company. Graber Construc80
tion Company opposed the amendment as time-barred.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 127-28, 560 N.E.2d at 1092-93.
Id. at 128, 560 N.E.2d at 1093.
115 Ill. App. 3d 532, 450 N.E.2d 482 (4th Dist. 1983).
140 Ill. App. 3d 584, 488 N.E.2d 1111 (5th Dist. 1986).
Evans, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 535, 450 N.E.2d at 484.
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In Campbell v. Feuquay,l s x the plaintiff sued South Roxana
Market and served its owner, Edith Feuquay. The defendant filed a
general denial but otherwise participated in the pleadings and discovery as South Roxana Market. During discovery, the plaintiff
learned that South Roxana Market was merely an assumed name
used by its sole proprietor, Edith Feuquay. By this time, however,
the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff then moved to
amend the complaint to add Edith Feuquay, d/b/a South Roxana
Market, Inc., and the newly named defendant objected on the
grounds that the amendment exceeded the limitations period. The
court found that the general denial was too ambiguous a response to
forewarn the plaintiff of his mistake before the running of the statute, and that Feuquay should have been more forthcoming in identifying the proper defendant when specifically asked to do so in
discovery. The court also found that since Edith Feuquay was operating a business under an assumed name, she should have registered that name with the Secretary of State pursuant to the
Assumed Name Statute. i8 2 The court concluded that the plaintiff's
error had been inadvertent in light of the defendant's conduct.
The Evans and Campbell cases were given remarkably similar
treatment by their respective courts. Both cases identified the critical issue as inadvertence, which typically allows post-limitations
service if due diligence is exercised after the plaintiff learns of the
error giving rise to the amendment. However, in determining inadvertence, the Campbell and Evans courts looked not to the plaintiffs' behavior, but rather, to the defendants' ability to mitigate or
correct plaintiff's error and the reasonableness of plaintiff's conduct in light of the defendants' failure to proceed forthrightly to
make the correction. Both cases placed heavy reliance on defendants' participation in the litigation under the incorrect name, and
failure to correct the improper name or identify the proper defendant, despite knowledge of such. Each finding of inadvertence was
based on the conclusion that the plaintiffs' reliance on the defendants' misleading conduct was reasonable and the error, therefore,
unavoidable. Hence, even though these cases were cast in terms of
inadvertence, by shifting the inquiry from the plaintiffs' conduct to
the defendants' conduct, these holdings were actually based on estoppel: the defendants were foreclosed from raising the statute of
limitations defense since they knowingly participated in the confusion that gave rise to the untimely amendment. In both Campbell
and Evans, the defendants were particularly culpable because they
181. Campbell, 140 Ill. App. 3d 584, 488 N.E.2d 1111.
182. Id. at 589, 488 N.E.2d at 1114. The purpose of the Assumed Name Statute is to forewarn the public of a business' multiple identities. 805 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 405/1-4 (1992) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 96, para. 4 (1991)).
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knowingly concealed the real defendants' identity. 8 3
c.

Cases Which Reject Estoppel as a Cure for Misidentification
Defects

The estoppel argument has not been universally accepted by
the lower courts in spite of its recognition in Vaughn.i8 4 Two recent appellate court decisions have refused to allow estoppel to cure
misidentification errors. In Thomson v. McDonald's, Inc.,185 filed
just two months after Vaughn, the first district decided a case
which was virtually the reverse image of Evans and Campbell. In
Thomson, the plaintiff filed a personal injury complaint against McDonald's, Inc. McDonald's filed a general denial to the complaint,
investigated the claim, and engaged in discovery. Eventually, the
plaintiff learned that the action should have been brought against
Harry and Theodore Theodore, the owners of the McDonald's
franchise. Because the statute of limitations had run, the plaintiff
argued that the amended complaint should relate back to the filing
of the original complaint since, by its participation in the litigation,
McDonald's had fraudulently concealed the plaintiff's cause of action against the Theodores. Further, the plaintiff added that the
Theodores would not be prejudiced by the out-of-time amendment
since both they and McDonald's were represented by the same
counsel. The court, however, found that the plaintiff was solely responsible for her predicament since she had been given timely notice that she sued the wrong party by virtue of McDonald's general
denial. Further, she had not diligently moved to compel answers to
discovery, and had also failed to verify the identification of the
proper defendant by investigating public records. The court regarded McDonald's silence, in light of the plaintiff's misimpression,
as inconsequential. Finally, the court found that the lack of an express agency provision in the franchise agreement absolved McDonald's of any responsibility for its franchisee's liabilities.
Perhaps both the plaintiff and the court missed the point in
this case. Clearly, the plaintiff could not have met her burden of
proving fraudulent concealment against McDonald's. However, the
plaintiff might have prevailed had she argued that the Theodores
were estopped to assert the statute of limitations defense by virtue
of McDonald's litigation conduct and its concurrent representation
183. Campbell, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 590, 488 N.E.2d at 1115; Evans, 115 Ill. App.
3d at 533-35, 450 N.E.2d at 483-84. It is unclear if the results of these cases would
have differed if the defendants had been innocent or had the improper defendants been more forthcoming in identifying the proper defendants. See Camp-

bell, 140 Ill. App. 3d 584, 488 N.E.2d 1111; Evans, 115 Ill. App. 3d 532, 450 N.E.2d
482.
184. Vaughn v. Speaker, 126 Ill. 2d 150, 533 N.E.2d 885 (1988).
185. 180 Ill. App. 3d 984, 536 N.E.2d 760 (1st Dist. 1989).
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by the Theodores' attorneys, both of which inured to the Theodores'
exclusive benefit and to the plaintiff's detriment. The court then
could not have interposed the agency theory to defeat the estoppel
argument since, in Vaughn, there was no agency relationship between the decedent and the executor nor was one found to be a
186
prerequisite to a finding of estoppel.
A less questionable result occurred in the 1990 case of McCammant v. McCarthy1 8 7 in which the third district acknowledged
Vaughn's acceptance of estoppel in a similar context, but found the
instant case distinguishable. After a car accident, the plaintiff entered into negotiations with the defendant's insurance company.
During these negotiations, but unknown to the plaintiff, the defendant died. Before the running of the statute of limitations, the
plaintiff filed a complaint designating the decedent as the defendant. The decedent's executor was served, but not until after the
running of the statute. The court found that the insurance company's litigation conduct was not misleading and declined to impute
the insurer's knowledge to the executor. Since the court could find
no other basis for acceding to an estoppel argument, it dismissed the
amended complaint. A concurrence, written by Justice Stouder, reluctantly agreed that the estoppel principle espoused in Vaughn
could not save this case but still questioned the fairness of the result
in light of the fact that the insurance company, the real party in
interest, had knowledge of the action prior to the running of the
statute of limitations. To this anomalous situation, Justice Stouder
observed:
Either by statute or otherwise, plaintiffs in McCammant's position

should be afforded some form of relief from the normal operations of
the statute of limitations. In our mobile society, more often than not
plaintiffs and defendants do not live in the same community. Hence,
plaintiffs are unlikely to hear of a defendant's death. Also, since the
insurance company is the real party in interest in these actions, if the
action is filed within the statute of limitations, the insurance company's knowledge should be attributable to the executors of the decedent's estate. In this type of case neither the plaintiff nor his attorney
have any reasonable or practical way of monitoring the defendant's life
or death. Consequently the application of the statute of limitations, as
in this case, produces an unfair result without any benefit to the legal
188
system.
186. Vaughn, 126 Ill. 2d at 163, 533 N.E.2d at 891; see also Thomson, 180 Ill.
App. 3d 984, 536 N.E.2d 760 (illustrating that an agency relationship is not an
element of estoppel).
187. 202 Ill. App. 3d 812, 560 N.E.2d 432 (3d Dist. 1990).
188. Id. at 186, 560 N.E.2d at 434 (Stouder, J., concurring).
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Summary

This line of cases demonstrates the application of the estoppel
concept in the misidentification context. Vaughn used estoppel to
override misidentification defects which otherwise would have been
fatal to the plaintiff's case. So used, estoppel served as an alternative and independent ground to cure a paragraph 2-616(d) defect.
This use of estoppel shifts the focus of the paragraph 2-616(d) inquiry from the plaintiff's conduct to the defendant's conduct. The
cases of Bates and Anane also used the estoppel concept to shift the
focus of the inquiry from the plaintiff's to the defendant's conduct,
but only after the plaintiff had established compliance with paragraph 2-616(d). Thus, estoppel was actually unnecessary to the outcome of these cases but functioned as an additional basis for a
paragraph 2-616(d) finding. However, by using estoppel to support
compliance, the court broadened the application of estoppel to situations where a weak showing of compliance could be bolstered by a
strong demonstration of the defendant's obstructionist conduct.
Thomson and McCammant demonstrated that estoppel will not be
given a wide berth short of a clear showing of misleading conduct
by the defendant.
In summary, estoppel now serves two functions in the misidentification context: it can bolster a showing of compliance, or it can
be a substitute for noncompliance with a statutory condition.
Either way, use of estoppel shifts the issue from the plaintiff's behavior to the defendant's behavior. Importantly, only the plaintiff 's behavior is addressed in the statute. Why, then, are some
courts superimposing the estoppel device onto the misidentification
statute? Perhaps the courts are reaching for estoppel because the
requirement of inadvertence is too discretionary and open-ended to
provide practical guidelines for the bench and bar. Perhaps, also,
the problem lies with conditions (3) and (4) which work on an
either/or basis rather than in the conjunctive. To avoid the inherent contradictions of the conjunctive use of conditions (3) and (4),
the courts have fused them by equating service with knowledge
and, in so doing, have eliminated condition (4) as an independent
ground under paragraph 2-616(d). For the time being, the use of
estoppel to cure defects in the statute may serve that intended purpose but, lest the exceptions swallow the rule, it is not an effective
resolution of the problems caused by the statute.
III.

A.

CRITIQUE

Unresolved Issues for the Bench

As demonstrated throughout this study, the misnomer/misidentification scheme has been rendered unmanageable by
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inconsistent or inappropriate treatment of certain elements, resulting in destabilization of the entire statutory scheme.
1.

State of Mind Requirements

The most problematic of these elements are the multiple and
ill-defined state of mind requirements. For example, when construed restrictively, courts hold that the plaintiff's "intent" to serve
process on a particular party can be proven only by the designations
set forth in the caption.' 8 9 Such cases, however, often employ
hyperformalistic solutions which terminate the plaintiff's judicial
recourse.' 90 The caption limitation is an irrational basis for determining intent since, as many plaintiffs frequently have argued, no
plaintiff ever intends to sue the wrong defendant.' 9 '
Further, when construed broadly, 92 intent can encompass behavior ranging from nonfeasance 93 to purposeful conduct. 94 Such
overbroad construction renders the intent requirement meaningless. At this juncture, it is important to ask if the inclusion of intent
in the statutory scheme is consistent with the scheme's goals. Given
its inconsistent construction and application by the courts, the
scheme may be better served by deleting the intent requirement.
Similarly, the courts must resolve the kinds of behavior that
satisfy the "inadvertence" requirement and the proper function of
inadvertence within the statute. For example, can inadvertence
substitute for noncompliance with conditions (3) or (4)? Can a
weak case of inadvertence be bolstered by an estoppel argument?
Finally, should "knowledge" under paragraph 2-616(d) be broadened to include conduct other than service of process and be extended beyond to the statute of limitations to avoid imposing a
shorter service period on misidentification cases than exists for any
other Illinois actions? 95
189. See, e.g., Thompson v. Ware, 210 Ill. App. 3d 16, 568 N.E.2d 500 (4th Dist.
1991); Griffith v. Pincham, 67 Ill. App. 3d 316, 384 N.E.2d 870 (1st Dist. 1978).
190. See supra note 188 for relevant case law. See also Behr v. Club Med,
Inc., 190 Ill. App. 3d 396, 546 N.E.2d 751 (1st Dist. 1989) (interpreting state of
mind requirements restrictively).
191. Barbour v. Fred Berglund & Sons, Inc., 208 Ill. App. 3d 644, 651, 567
N.E.2d 509, 514 (1st Dist. 1990).
192. For a discussion of intent see supra notes 4-92 and accompanying text
and notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Obviously, the courts are torn between the clear objectivity of a statute
of limitations on the one hand, and the equitable notion of a curative act on the
other.
Essentially, statutes of limitations fix a time beyond which ... disputes,
claims and matters can no longer be brought forth for judicial determination. Simply by withdrawing the privilege to litigate and denying the aid of
the courts in asserting claims and interests of ancient origin, they effectu-
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2. Agency
A second major weakness in the misnomer/misidentification
scheme is the treatment of agency. Agency has received varied and
inconsistent treatment in the estoppel, business names, individual
names, and representative action contexts. Courts need to resolve
the relationship between estoppel and agency, i.e., whether an
agent's knowledge of the action, participation in the action, or receipt of service of process will estop the principal from invoking a
statute of limitations defense? If so, what relationships or situations will constitute agency relationships for misnomer/misidentification purposes? 196 Further, if an incorrect business or individual is
sued or served but has an affiliation with the proper defendant,
should the burden of disclosure lie with the defendant or should the
burden of discovery lie with the plaintiff? Finally, what kind of
conduct will shift the burdens?
Last, per the McCammant dissent, in a representative action
where the insurance company has prior knowledge of the action,
should the insurance company's knowledge be imputed to the decedent and/or the executors even if they are not named and/or served
within the time requirements of the statute? Similarly, when the
plaintiff sues a dead person instead of the estate, the complaint is
considered a nullity since the amendment has nothing to which to
relate back. This conclusion is based on the principle that since the
deceased and the estate cannot exist simultaneously, they are separate legal entities. Can the estate succeed to the deceased's interest
as the real party in interest just as it does for winding up the deceate a number of important public policies. Further, although the application of a rigidly fixed time limitation in a particular case may appear
arbitrary, no one doubts that, in general, they tend to promote justice as
between parties to controversies.
Lewis M. Simes, IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION (1960) re-

printed in Paul Goldstein, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 288 (1988).
On the other hand, since human nature is fallible, a rationale arises for a
second device---one which counters the harsh results of a statute of limitations.
This is the curative act.
A curative act is one which reaches back and corrects an error made in the
past .... In general, curative statutes may be said to deal with matters of a
formal character and to carry out the intentions of the parties which may
otherwise have been frustrated by their failure to comply with formal requirements .... In spite of their limitations, curative acts have been in
operation since colonial times. They have dealt with a variety of situations,
such as the following: absence of a seal; defective acknowledgements; failure to include any acknowledgement; defective conveyances under powers
of attorney; defectively executed deeds of corporations; defective records of
judicial sales.
Id. at 286-87.
196. See Thompson v. Ware, 210 Ill. App. 3d 16, 568 N.E.2d 500 (4th Dist.
1991); Leonard v. City of Streator, 113 Ill. App. 3d 404, 447 N.E.2d 489 (3d Dist.
1983).
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dent's affairs? Such treatment would allow designation errors to be
characterized as misnomers since the estate would be deemed the
action's real party in interest.
B.
1.

Analytical Guidelines

Eleventh Hour Filings and Inadvertence

While complex corporate structures and strategic defense tactics account for some misnomer/misidentification errors, the majority of cases actually result from eleventh hour filings precipitating
such errors. Where corporate defendants are involved, plaintiffs'
attorneys are advised to consult the Secretary of State's corporate
index before filing. If time does not permit, this search must be
performed immediately after filing. Further, any needed amendments should be made as soon as possible, with an adequate work
record to prove due diligence. However, given the current construction of paragraph 2-616(d), once the statute of limitations has run,
there is little a plaintiff's attorney can do to save the action.
2. Decedents/Estatesand RepresentativeActions
A decedent and his or her estate are not "one" for purposes of
the relation back doctrine. The Illinois Supreme Court has held
that, even though the estate is the legal successor to certain rights
and liabilities of the decedent, the decedent and the estate are
wholly distinct legal entities. As a result, the estate cannot be substituted for the decedent as a misnomer. Further, failure to meet
the five elements of paragraph 2-616(d) as to the estate, even if satisfied for the decedent, will result in dismissal of the suit.-9 7
3. Dramshop Actions
The owner of the establishment may not necessarily be the
owner of the liquor license and, thus, not the real party in interest.
Also, the liquor license holder and the owner of the establishment,
if different, are not "one" for purposes of the relation back doctrine
under paragraph 2-616(d). 198
4.

Franchisor/Franchisee

First, it is important to distinguish between the owner of the
franchise and the name of the franchise. Incorrect designation may
not be correctable as a misnomer. Second, franchisors and franchis197. See Vaughn v. Speaker, 126 Ill. 2d 150, 533 N.E.2d 885 (1988).
198. See, e.g., Ellis v. Borisek, 220 Ill. App. 3d 48, 580 N.E.2d 899 (3d Dist.
1991); Hoving v. Davies, 159 Ill. App. 3d 106, 512 N.E.2d 729 (1st Dist. 1987);
Leonard, 113 Ill. App. 3d 404, 447 N.E.2d 489.
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ees frequently enter into hold-harmless agreements which release
the franchisor, corporate parent, or holding company from any liability in the event of a law suit. Unfortunately, information regarding the corporate structure may not be revealed until disclosed in
discovery, often long after the expiration of the limitations period.
Unless there is an agency relationship between franchisor and franchisee, or an estoppel argument can be put forth, the plaintiff's suit
may well be lost.199
5.

Businesses Conducted Under an Assumed Name

A number of businesses operate under assumed names. Such
assumed names, when captioned as defendants, are not considered
legal entities for purposes of filing suit and are never considered a
real party in interest. Unless the true owner or agent fortuitously is
served within the statute of limitations, these suits are generally
2
subject to dismissal. 00
6. Persons Sharing the Same or Similar Name
Again, while a simple misspelling of the real party in interest's
name will not disqualify a suit, service upon the wrong party-who
may coincidentally share the same or similar name as the real party
in interest-can be fatal to the plaintiff if amendment and service
upon the real party in interest are not effected within the statute of
201
limitations.
7. Implied Estoppel: the General Denial and Defendant's Duty to
Disclose
Defendants are advised to be more forthcoming with accurate
information if they know of the plaintiff's naming error. Campbell
and Evans have started to erode the presumption, relied on so heavily in the Griffith case, that defendants may stand mute in light of a
known erroneous designation made by plaintiff. 20 2 The case law,
especially in the third district, suggests that defendants do indeed
199. See, e.g., Thomson v. McDonald's, Inc., 180 Ill. App. 3d 984, 536 N.E.2d
760 (1st Dist. 1989) (dismissing suit when plaintiff attempted to sue franchise
and did not obtain service on proper party).
200. See, e.g., Campbell v. Feuquay, 140 Ill. App. 3d 584, 488 N.E.2d 1111 (5th
Dist. 1986) (showing a plaintiff's suit which failed due to the assumed name of
the business defendant).
201. See, e.g., Thompson v. Ware, 210 Ill. App. 3d 16, 568 N.E.2d 500 (4th Dist.
1991) (demonstrating the effect of service upon the wrong party with a similar
name as the real party in interest).
202. Campbell, 140 Ill. App. 3d 584, 488 N.E.2d 1111; Evans v. Graber, Inc., 115
Ill. App. 3d 532, 450 N.E.2d 482 (4th Dist. 1983). But see Thomson, 180 Ill. App.
3d 984, 536 N.E.2d 760 (adhering more closely to the reasoning of the Griffith
case).
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have a duty of disclosure when they have knowledge of the real
party in interest. Defense attorneys are also warned that the use of
a general denial may be too ambiguous to alert a plaintiff to a
designation error and, thus, may later provide the plaintiff with an
effective estoppel argument.
IV.

AFTERWORD-PROPOSED STATUTORY MODIFICATION

Any modifications of the current statutory scheme should take
into account the problems arising in the case law. For example, the
current legislative categories of misnomer and misidentification are
not specific enough to address the multiple and overlapping categories of parties to which they have been applied. Thus, any legislative changes should reverse this trend by providing, instead, a more
specific articulation of the two provisions. In addition, any proposed
modifications should address the following basic principals: First,
was the real party in interest served within the limitations period
with due diligence? Second, did the real party in interest have actual notice and/or appear and defend? Third, did the real party in
interest know, or should it have known, that but for the mistake
concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have
been brought against it?20 3 With these concerns in mind, the following statutory scheme is proposed:
1. ProposedStatute for Misnomer
At any time, before or after judgment, and upon such terms and proof
that the court requires, an amendment correcting the name of a current defendant, who is the real party in interest to the action, may relate back to the filing of the initial complaint. Misnomer is not a
ground for dismissal.

2. Proposed Statutefor Misidentification
A cause of action against a person not originally named as a defendant
is not barred by lapse of time under any statute or contract prescribing
or limiting the time within which an action may be brought or right
asserted, if all the following terms and conditions are met:
(1) the time prescribed or limited had not expired when the original action was commenced;
(2) service of summons was in fact had upon the person before or
after the appropriate limitations period. The term person shall include
(i) an agent, partner, as the nature of the defendant made appropriate,
even though he or she was served in the wrong capacity or as agent of
another; (ii) the real party in interest; (iii) a business conducted under
an assumed name or such business' owner; (iv) a decedent whose death
was unknown to the plaintiff at the time of filing of the action; (v) a
decedent's insurance company, (vi) a trustee;
203. Changes in PartyAfter Statute of LimitationsHas Run, supra note 3, at
38 (citing Rich's, Inc. v. Snyder, 134 Ga. App. 889, 216 S.E.2d 648 (1975)).
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(3) the person, within the time that the action might have been
brought or the right asserted against him or her, knew that the original
action was pending and that it grew out of a transaction or occurrence
involving or concerning him or her; and
(4) it appears from the original and amended pleadings that the
cause of action asserted in the amended pleading grew out of the same
transaction or occurrence set forth in the original pleading, even
though the original pleading was defective in that it failed to allege the
performance of some act or the existence of some fact or some other
matter which is a necessary condition precedent to the right of recovery when the condition precedent has in fact been performed, and even
though the person was not named originally as a defendant. For the
purpose of preserving the cause of action under those conditions, an
amendment adding the person as a defendant relates back to the date
of filing of the original pleading so amended.
CONCLUSION
When viewed in tandem, the misnomer/misidentification provisions do not serve the twofold purposes for which they were enacted-to resolve disputes on their merits and to distinguish
misspellings from misjoinders. As to the first purpose, the Illinois
Code of Civil Procedure is based on the premise that procedural
issues are to be treated liberally, to "do justice, '20 4 rather than to
narrow, restrict, or abolish substantive rights. Taken in isolation,
the misnomer provision achieves this purpose. However, the misidentification provision is all too often subject to hyperformalistic
resolutions that terminate a plaintiff's recourse to the court before
the case can ever be considered on its merits.
As to the second purpose, the courts have yet to come to terms
with the critical distinction between misnomer and misidentification. Misnomer permits a name correction or change provided the
real party in interest was designated in the original complaint. It
does not entail joinder. Misidentification, on the other hand, permits the joinder of a new party who was not previously designated
as a party to the action.
On its face, the highly discretionary language of paragraph 2401(b) has given rise to a body of case law which easily breaks down
in terms of analytical consistency and results, whereas the highly
conditioned language of paragraph 2-616(d) has given rise to a hopelessly scrambled morass of cases which are analytically disjointed
and inconsistent in result. Rather than unscramble the confusion,
courts have superimposed "intent" and "estoppel" to rectify statutory infractions by plaintiffs or to punish obstructionist behavior by
204. Shiner v. Friedman, 161 Ill. App. 3d 73, 79, 513 N.E.2d 862, 865 (1st Dist.

1987); see also 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-106 (1992) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para.
1-106 (1991)) (stating its rules are to be construed liberally to determine the
rights of the parties).
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defendants. These self help judicial resolutions ultimately serve to
further destabilize the already fragile and confused distinctions between misnomer and misidentification. Accordingly, the legislature
should consider redrafting the statutory scheme to resolve the
problems addressed in the substantial body of case law that has developed under these two provisions.

